Re: [DNSOP] Definition of "validating resolver"

Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> Tue, 10 March 2015 00:13 UTC

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To: Willem Toorop <willem@nlnetlabs.nl>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <DED3D224-C507-4751-808C-3D881A238942@vpnc.org> <20150308223157.GA2770@PorcupineTree> <54FDB221.8020903@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 11:13:39 +1100
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Definition of "validating resolver"
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In message <54FDB221.8020903@nlnetlabs.nl>, Willem Toorop writes:
> I'd like to maintain the term exactly as specified in RFC4033
> (understanding DNSSEC but not validating), because it comes in use when
> talking about validating stubs.
> 
> Some network operators don't know or care about DNSSEC and do not equip
> their network's resolver with a trust anchor.  Such a resolver is
> obviously not validating, but if it is a modern resolver it is very
> likely to be security-aware.
> 
> An application using a validating stub can leverage such a resolver to
> get DNSSEC answers from the cache which it can then validate itself.
> For example to get an authenticated TLSA and bootstrap an encrypted channel.

Which works most of the time as there are very few attacks and the
resolvers do a pretty good job of dealing with the broken authoritative
servers and poorly configured firewalls that block legitimate
replies.  If you want reliable DNSSEC then these resolvers also
need to validate.

> I have presented measurements on the amount of security-aware resolvers
> in RIPE ATLAS in the context of this use case at ICANN50:
> 
> https://london50.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/presentation-dnssec-validat
> ion-deployment-25jun14-en.pdf
> 
> Though in the research we called those DNSSEC-aware instead of
> security-aware.
> 
> -- Willem
> 
> Op 08-03-15 om 23:31 schreef Ralf Weber:
> > Moin!
> > 
> > On Sun, Mar 08, 2015 at 12:21:49PM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> >> Greetings again. Paul Wouters noticed an inconsistency in the terminology
> >> draft, and upon investigation, I believe it is a problem (hopefully
> >> fixable) with the definitions in RFC 4033.  RFC 4033 and 4035 use the term
> >> "validating resolver" in a few places.  However, RFC 4033 never defines
> >> that.  RFC 4033 *does* define "security-aware resolver":
> >>
> >>    Security-Aware Resolver: An entity acting in the role of a resolver
> >>       (defined in section 2.4 of [RFC1034]) that understands the DNS
> >>       security extensions defined in this document set.  In particular,
> >>       a security-aware resolver is an entity that sends DNS queries,
> >>       receives DNS responses, supports the EDNS0 ([RFC2671]) message
> >>       size extension and the DO bit ([RFC3225]), and is capable of using
> >>       the RR types and message header bits defined in this document set
> >>       to provide DNSSEC services.
> >>
> >> My personal interpretation is that "validating resolver" is a synonym for
> >> "security-aware resolver".  Do others agree?  If not, how would you
> >> differentiate them?
> > I was told that the difference is that a security aware resolver does
> > not validate, but instead relies on the "Validating Stub Resolver" to 
> > protect the user. So it would handle all the DNSSEC processing to the
> > authoritative and would store the records with signatures in the cache,
> > but it wouldn't check if they are valid. 
> > 
> > The people who told me that interpreation of the RFC never did deploy DNSSE
> C
> > and thankfully most of the people who did and deployed DNSSEC used
> > validating and security aware resolvers. I don't think it makes sense to
> > deploy a caching resolver without validation.  So would be ok if we define
> > it as you suggest.
> 
> 
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-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org