Re: [DNSOP] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-roadblock-avoidance-04: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 05 August 2016 21:24 UTC

Return-Path: <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 197E812D741; Fri, 5 Aug 2016 14:24:20 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -5.588
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.588 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-1.287, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cs.tcd.ie
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qQsIL-hzMnjm; Fri, 5 Aug 2016 14:24:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7AA0812D501; Fri, 5 Aug 2016 14:24:17 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id A04EABE55; Fri, 5 Aug 2016 22:24:15 +0100 (IST)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie
Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id beUvevqxO6tL; Fri, 5 Aug 2016 22:24:14 +0100 (IST)
Received: from [10.87.48.210] (95-45-153-252-dynamic.agg2.phb.bdt-fng.eircom.net [95.45.153.252]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C1998BE49; Fri, 5 Aug 2016 22:24:13 +0100 (IST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1470432254; bh=rPwO51yOfGbOJ6H4UIJftZpIgezJSxVZ12kepKIxifI=; h=Subject:To:References:Cc:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=sHLK3YlK6chlc/V4fDyKn3eJHn8kUB5Qak5clWjmxQThsSAyOTjuw546gsAbNIIwH Zw7zLxMyan7NhTyEVWMH7jyRdPw9SmIdhRsAZuxgo5tzDeMVJI6v8s6ll5GNruv49o QLnt6eG42+SkRKiVHwxhnOCdBnfAlAi0CdjseVA0=
To: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
References: <20160704231646.2555.84849.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <0l60re29u2.fsf@wjh.hardakers.net>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url=
Message-ID: <1e53ec09-1f54-08e4-1622-02705fc48398@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2016 22:24:13 +0100
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.2.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <0l60re29u2.fsf@wjh.hardakers.net>
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha-256"; boundary="------------ms040905030001010403080902"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/vbL7dKhcdzf8YxUjrMxXtV2XX3o>
Cc: tjw.ietf@gmail.com, dnsop@ietf.org, draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-roadblock-avoidance@ietf.org, dnsop-chairs@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-roadblock-avoidance-04: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2016 21:24:20 -0000

Hi Wes,

On 05/08/16 22:18, Wes Hardaker wrote:
> "Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> writes:
> 
>> Why omit sha256 (in particular Alg = 8) from this?  That
>> seems like a quite bad plan and *not* a BCP given our
>> current knowledge of hash functions.
> 
> I've changed the text to test for both.  I think that's a good suggestion.

Great thanks. Happy to clear when you post an update with
that handled.

The points below were non-blocking comments, so no need for
us to bat 'em back and forth. (Your responses are reasonable,
even if I might quibble a bit with 'em, but overall it's probably
better to get your doc out.)

Cheers,
S.

> 
>> general, mostly 3.x.y: it'd have been nice to include a
>> dig command line for each of these tests - that'd save the
>> non-expert reader some time and allow easy scripting of
>> most of this BCP.
> 
> I thought about that, but it would require significant explanation and
> not all of the tests (I think) have behavior which is observable by
> dig.  Plus, dig is but one of many software tools and would seem to bias
> the document toward ISC's version.
> 
>> general: Why not say to include a test with a known, but
>> not well-known, public key (or DS) to check if anyone on
>> the path is fibbing? E.g. a tester could remember a few
>> public keys and check that they've not changed in a new
>> location.  While that may only catch out a cheating real
>> parent, did you consider including such a test?
> 
> No, because that game is cat and mouse just like most other security
> detection problems.  There is no way to define a conclusive test that
> can't be fooled by someone on the wire [for once the attacker learns
> once, he'll know the second time to behave differently].
> 
>> - 3.1.4: How is a "recently defined type" a reasonable
>> thing to check for in a BCP? Seems odd anyway.
> 
> I'd think software implementations, as they rolled out, would update
> their test to use the latest assigned type code.  I had an equally hard
> time with that question, but it does provide valuable input though it's
> not easy to adequately describe.
> 
>> - 6.1: what if there is no user? Why not recommend telling
>> some network observatory? Aren't there some for DNSSEC?
> 
> There aren't any.  We do mention logging the results in section 6 though.
>