[DNSOP] regarding dnssec-key-timing RFC 7583

shabbir ali <solaris98@gmail.com> Mon, 10 September 2018 18:56 UTC

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From: shabbir ali <solaris98@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 23:56:00 +0500
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Subject: [DNSOP] regarding dnssec-key-timing RFC 7583
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Hi all,
My question is that instead of messing with the DNSSEC key Rollover timing
and all that manual and automation tools dependencies, why not simply use a
key revocation list just like a certificate revocation list (CRL) ?