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Re: [DNSOP] New Version of draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update-00: Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC

Ondřej Surý <ondrej@isc.org> Fri, 23 March 2018 16:14 UTC

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From: Ondřej Surý <ondrej@isc.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] New Version of draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update-00: Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC
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I agree with Victor and I believe this is what the draft currently says and recommends.

Ondřej 
--
Ondřej Surý — ISC

> On 23 Mar 2018, at 15:58, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wrote:
> 
>> On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 01:27:38PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote:
>> 
>> I think this text also needs an update:
>> 
>>    RSASHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 are widely deployed, although zones
>>    deploying it are recommended to switch to ECDSAP256SHA256 as there is
>>    an industry-wide trend to move to elliptic curve cryptography.
>> 
>> They should switch away from SHA1 as SHA1 is being deprecated industry
>> wide. Even if we recommend to move away from RSA (which I'm not sure if there
>> is consensus on) to ECC, I would like to move them to ED25519/ED448 over
>> the ECDSA* variants.
> 
> I think it is, unfortunately, much too early for such a move.  For
> example, on Unix systems the requisite OpenSSL 1.1.x libraries that
> provide the Edwards EC algorithms, are not yet out of beta!  It
> will be some years before Ed25519 and Ed448 can be expected to be
> widely supported by resolvers.  Therefore, I would still strongly
> recommend ECDSA, which is widely supported.
> 
> We should certainly encourage the implementation of Ed25519/Ed448
> in resolver and nameserver implementations, but it is much too
> early for adoption, beyond dual DS/KSKs one ECDSA and another
> Ed25519, with the client choosing whichever it prefers.  ZSKs should
> IMHO migrate to ECDSA for now to alleviate packet size issues.
> 
>> If it is too soon for that now, I would simply not recommend moving away
>> from RSA. And maybe make ECDSAP256SHA256 a MAY instead of a MUST.
> 
> I disagree.  ECDSA is widely adopted, and more adoption will help
> to reduce packet sizes and improved performance of online signing
> where desired (load-balaced responses with DNSSEC, ...).
> 
> -- 
>    Viktor.
> 
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