Re: [dnssd] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-dnssd-push-20

Tom Pusateri <pusateri@bangj.com> Tue, 02 July 2019 19:42 UTC

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From: Tom Pusateri <pusateri@bangj.com>
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Date: Tue, 02 Jul 2019 15:42:12 -0400
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Cc: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>, draft-ietf-dnssd-push.all@ietf.org, DNSSD <dnssd@ietf.org>
To: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnssd] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-dnssd-push-20
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Thanks David.

The only other transport I could see being relevant in the future is QUIC. But there are lots of unknowns about DNS over QUIC at present so I think we can safely assume that would require a new PUSH draft to specify the behavior.

So I think your suggestion is a good one.

Tom


> On Jul 2, 2019, at 3:36 PM, David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Tom,
> 
> If the protocol is restricted to TLS over TCP, it should send a TLS close_notify, not a TCP RST.
> TLS close_notify is cryptographically guaranteed to originate from the peer,
> whereas TCP RST can be injected by an on-path entity to cause truncation attacks.
> 
> Thanks,
> David
> 
> 
> > Page 23, top of page: Since section 4 restricts this protocol to TLS over TCP,
> > the "(or equivalent for other protocols)" phrase should be removed.
> 
> Good catch. I removed all instances of "(or equivalent for other protocols)”