Re: [dnssd] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-dnssd-push-19

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Sat, 15 June 2019 17:21 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2019 13:21:06 -0400
Cc: Liang Xia <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>, draft-ietf-dnssd-push.all@ietf.org, dnssd@ietf.org, IETF <ietf@ietf.org>, secdir@ietf.org
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To: Tom Pusateri <pusateri@bangj.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnssd] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-dnssd-push-19
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The primary motivation for using tls is opportunistic security. Authentication would be interesting to add. SNI encryption would be interesting but I think is a separate topic. 

Client authorization might be useful in some cases, but generally is not done in DNS servers. To address these would require a security analysis of much broader scope than is appropriate for this document. We’ve talked about this in the context of homenet. 

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jun 15, 2019, at 12:47 PM, Tom Pusateri <pusateri@bangj.com> wrote:
> 
> Does this address your concerns?
> 
>> On May 17, 2019, at 11:59 AM, Tom Pusateri <pusateri@bangj.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Will also address TLS comments.
>> 
>>> 3. In the section of Security Considerations:
>>>  1) you should also mention that TLS provides the anti-replay protection
>>>  service for DNS Push;
> 
> I have added a 4th security service in the Security section:
> 
> Anti-replay protection:  TLS provides for the detection of and
>      prevention against messages sent previously over a TLS connection
>      (such as DNS Push Notifications).  Prior messages cannot be re-
>      sent at a later time as a form of a man-in-the-middle attack.
> 
>>> 2) maybe you need to consider the client
>>>  authentication to achieve policy control and detect illegal client;
> 
> I have added a new paragraph in the Security section:
> 
> As a consequence of requiring TLS, client certificate authentication
>   and verification may also be enforced by the server for stronger
>   client-server security or end-to-end security.  However,
>   recommendations for security in particular deployment scenarios are
>   outside the scope of this document.
> 
>>> 3) TLS
>>>  WG are specifying the SNI encryption mechanism, will it influence your TLS
>>>  name authentication?
> 
> SNI encryption has no effect on our use of TLS name authentication.
> 
> Thanks,
> Tom
> 
> 
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