[Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Implementation
"Jon Shallow" <supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com> Wed, 02 August 2017 10:13 UTC
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From: Jon Shallow <supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com>
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Date: Wed, 02 Aug 2017 11:13:26 +0100
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Subject: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Implementation
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Hi There, I am trying to get my mind around how to implement this and have some questions / statements. Signal Channel The Signal channel looks very like Destination RTBH with some extras (protocols / port) as everything is target-* based. There is no concept of source-ip, source-port (to handle reflection attacks) etc. or dealing with fragmented packet, icmp types and rate-limiting. The DOTS client may have the smarts to work out what are the problematic source-* etc. values (e.g. can generate smart BGP FlowSpec rules) are that will sensibly control the DDoS Attack. It is possible to use a previously defined alias over the Data Channel as an alternative for a mitigation request, but this too has source-* etc. limitations. I have not found a way of using a Filter defined over the Data Channel as a signal Sending a signal will cause all traffic to stop (or rate-limit possibly if it also happens to match a filter) to the target IP on the ports in question - DDoS attack is now effective unless the DOTS server elects (via DNS or BGP swing) to scrub that particular traffic (by controlling rates, Source IPs / Source Ports etc.). Data Channel Can be used to set up aliases for later use. These again however appear to be target-* based, with no source-*, icmp type or fragmentation capabilities. Can set up a Filter, which does include both source and destination IPs, but appears that it is acted on when pushed over the data channel, and cannot be send as a signal - appears to be in place more for black/white listing IPs than as a signal for mitigation, but does include rate-limiting Questions How do we handle Source-* information in a mitigation signal request? How do we handle specific ICMP types in a mitigation signal request? How do we handle fragmentation in a mitigation signal request? Regards Jon
- [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Implementat… Jon Shallow
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Roland Dobbins
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Jon Shallow
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Dobbins, Roland
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… kaname nishizuka
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Jon Shallow
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Roland Dobbins
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Roland Dobbins
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Jon Shallow
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Jon Shallow
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Jon Shallow
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… kaname nishizuka
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… kaname nishizuka
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… kaname nishizuka
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Roland Dobbins
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Jon Shallow
- Re: [Dots] Signal / Data / Alias / Filter Impleme… Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy