Re: [Dots] Last Call: <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-19.txt> (Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry) to Proposed Standard

mohamed.boucadair@orange.com Mon, 17 January 2022 09:35 UTC

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From: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
To: tom petch <daedulus@btconnect.com>, "last-call@ietf.org" <last-call@ietf.org>
CC: "dots-chairs@ietf.org" <dots-chairs@ietf.org>, "valery@smyslov.net" <valery@smyslov.net>, "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-dots-telemetry@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Last Call: <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-19.txt> (Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry) to Proposed Standard
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Subject: Re: [Dots] Last Call: <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-19.txt> (Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry) to Proposed Standard
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Hi Tom, 

Thank you for the review. Much appreciated. 

Please see inline. 

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : tom petch <daedulus@btconnect.com>
> Envoyé : vendredi 14 janvier 2022 13:32
> À : last-call@ietf.org
> Cc : dots-chairs@ietf.org; valery@smyslov.net; dots@ietf.org; draft-
> ietf-dots-telemetry@ietf.org
> Objet : Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-19.txt> (Distributed
> Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry) to Proposed
> Standard
> 
> Some stray thoughts
> 
> I wonder if there is a recognised terminology for attacks, threats and
> such-like.  I have been looking at I2NSF I-D recently and they are,
> well, different.  I note too that secdir reviews thereof queried some of
> the I2NSF terminology but what is right and what is wrong?.  I am
> reminded of the efforts to produce a second version of the Security
> Glossary some time ago.

[Med] You may look at RFC4949, but that document requires a refresh. For the particular DoS case, RFC4732 is still a good reading reference. 

> 
> I find the use of -g and -ps alien.  I worked out what they mean but
> cannot help feeling that there is a clearer way to express this, such as
> pps, bps, Bps (YANG does not like capitalisation but does allow it where
> it is widely recognised, which, for me, Bps is).

[Med] *-g is used to identify nodes of gauge type while *-ps identifies nodes that are expressed as a value "per second". We don't include the reasoning of the naming convention as what matters is the description of the attributes, not their names. We can add a note if you think this is helpful. 

> 
> URI for IANA are inconsistent, http: and https: - since IANA allows
> http: (hurrah) I am easy with either but do like consistency

[Med] Fixed this one https://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers.html. Thanks. 

> 
> "The DOTS telemetry module (Section 10.1) uses "enumerations" rather
>     than "identities" to define units, samples, and intervals because
>     otherwise the namespace identifier "ietf-dots-telemetry" must be
>     included when a telemetry attribute is included "
> Well yes but that is saying the ietf-dots-telemetry is a bad choice of
> prefix - the 'ietf' is redundant and the 'telemetry' is prolix

[Med] We could shorten the prefix but the issue is still there:  have to include a prefix.  

> 
>        TBA: Overlapping pipe scope (see Section 12).
> could do with an explanatory note, perhaps one for the RFC Editor
> 

[Med] Sure. Added a note to Section 12.2. 

> 
>     vendor-id:  Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number as
>        registered with IANA [Enterprise-Numbers].  It is a four-byte
>        integer value.
> No, it is an integer which in this model is uint32 which can be
> represented in a number of ways

[Med] Fixed. 

> 
> The user has to understand that [Enterprise-Numbers] is the same as
> Private Enterprise Numbers", which may not be apparent; consistent
> terminology is good.

[Med] Not sure a (which) change is needed. The current text says:  

   vendor-id:  Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number as
      registered with IANA [Enterprise-Numbers].

with:

   [Enterprise-Numbers]
              "Private Enterprise Numbers", 4 May 2020,
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers.html>.

> 
> YANG TLD is out of date and URI lacks https:

[Med] OK

> 
> Authors vary between the frontispiece,

[Med] That is not an issue. 

 the YANG modules and Authors'
> Addresses

[Med] Fixed Tiru's address. Thanks. 

> 
> Two references in the YANG modules I do not see in the I-D References
>        <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.
>        "Section 4.4.2 of RFC UUUU.";
> The latter is not an RFC I am familiar with (but then that is true of
> most RFC:-(
> 

[Med] :-) Changed to "RFC 9132". Thanks. 

>      reference
>        "IANA: Private Enterprise Numbers"; would be clearer with a URI,
> whereever it occurs which is in more than one place
> 

[Med] Will leave this one for the RFC editor. 

> Security COnsiderations uses part of the YANG Guidelines template but
> not all

[Med] That is on purpose:
* we don't use it in 13.1 because this YANG module is not used for management purposes:

   The DOTS telemetry module (Section 10.1) is not intended to be used
   via NETCONF/RESTCONF for DOTS server management purposes.  It serves
   only to provide a data model and encoding following [RFC8791].

* as we are pointing to rfc8783#section-10, only new considerations are included here. 

; TLS is notable for its absence.
> 

[Med] That's covered in the 9132 and 8738. We don't repeat these aspects here. 

> Tom Petch
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/01/2022 14:32, The IESG wrote:
> >
> > The IESG has received a request from the DDoS Open Threat Signaling WG
> > (dots) to consider the following document: - 'Distributed
> > Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry'
> >    <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-19.txt> as Proposed Standard
> >
> > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> > final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> > last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2022-01-24. Exceptionally,
> > comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please
> > retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
> >
> > Abstract
> >
> >
> >     This document aims to enrich the DOTS signal channel protocol with
> >     various telemetry attributes, allowing for optimal Distributed
> >     Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigation.  It specifies the
> normal
> >     traffic baseline and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS
> >     client can convey to its DOTS server in the mitigation request,
> the
> >     mitigation status telemetry attributes a DOTS server can
> communicate
> >     to a DOTS client, and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes
> a
> >     DOTS client can communicate to a DOTS server.  The telemetry
> >     attributes can assist the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation
> >     techniques and perform optimal DDoS attack mitigation.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > The file can be obtained via
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dots-telemetry/
> >
> >
> >
> > No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > IETF-Announce mailing list
> > IETF-Announce@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
> > .
> >

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