[dtn] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC9173 (7002)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Tue, 21 June 2022 04:12 UTC

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Subject: [dtn] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC9173 (7002)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC9173,
"Default Security Contexts for Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7002

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Ed Birrane <ebirrane@gmail.com>

Section: A.4.4.1

Original Text
-------------
This BCB has two targets: the payload block and BIB.

Corrected Text
--------------
This BCB has two targets: the payload block and BIB. 

NOTE: This example implies using a single Initialization Vector (IV) for
two separate encryptions (a BIB and the payload). This violates the 
requirement in Section 4.3.1 that the "initialization vector ... MUST 
NOT be reused for multiple encryptions using the same encryption key.". 
When using the BCB-AES-GCM security context containing a specified 
Initialization Vector, each BCB should have only one security target.  


Notes
-----
This is listed as "editorial" and not technical because the error appears in a non-normative portion of the document.

Instructions:
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--------------------------------------
RFC9173 (draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-default-sc-11)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Default Security Contexts for Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec)
Publication Date    : January 2022
Author(s)           : E. Birrane, III, A. White, S. Heiner
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking
Area                : Transport
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG