Re: [EAT] {RATS] Introduction

["Diego R. Lopez" <[e-mail]>]

Agreed. You always need a root of trust to start with…

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Dr Diego R. Lopez
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On 13/09/2018, 12:42, "Carl Wallace" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:



From: "Diego R. Lopez" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Thursday, September 13, 2018 at 3:10 AM
To: "Eric Voit (evoit)" <evoit=[e-mail]<mailto:evoit=[e-mail]>>, Carl Wallace <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, Shawn Willden <swillden=[e-mail]<mailto:swillden=[e-mail]>>, "Smith, Ned" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: "[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, "[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [EAT] {RATS] Introduction

Hi,

If I am correctly following your proposal, this is connected with the idea of a trusted channel we experimented with in the SECURED project, and described in draft-pastor-i2nsf-vnsf-attestation:

“A trusted channel is an enhanced version of the secured channel. It adds the requirement of integrity verification of the contacted endpoint by the other peer during the initial handshake to the functionality of the secured channel. However, simply transmitting the integrity measurements over the channel does not guarantee that the platform verified is the channel endpoint. The public key or the certificate for the secure communication MUST be included as part of the measurements presented by the contacted endpoint during the remote attestation. This way, a malicious platform cannot relay the attestation to another platform as its certificate will not be present in the measurements list of the genuine platform.”

This only works if the public key/certificate associated with the remote endpoint can be obtained initially such that it is known to be correct. It's common to see artifacts that aim to demonstrate that something is a genuine product from Example Co without being able to demonstrate that something is a particular genuine product from Example Co. The latter is often necessary. Bootstrapping trust is hard, especially where it intersects with privacy concerns.


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