Re: [Eligibility-discuss] AD Sponsorship of draft-moonesamy-recall-rev

[Alissa Cooper <[e-mail]>]

Hi SM,

> On Apr 20, 2019, at 2:07 AM, S Moonesamy <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Dear Internet Engineering Steering Group,
> At 09:50 AM 18-04-2019, Alissa Cooper wrote:
>> I can only speak for myself and will let other ADs chime in if they want to.
>> 
>> I think the problem statement definition and the breadth of the changes to be proposed are intertwined, and require the depth of discussion we can get through a working group process. The underlying problem(s) that the draft seeks to address appear broader than the solutions proposed. Is the statement of the problem that the IETF process or its governance are unfair to remote participants? If so, the proposal in this draft is an incomplete solution to that problem. Is the statement of the problem that the recall process is dysfunctional because of barriers to using it? If so, the proposal in this draft is an incomplete solution to that problem and IMO misses the most compelling reason why recall petitions are not issued, which is that the perceived reputational risk to petitioners outweighs the perceived potential gain from issuing a recall petition.
> 
> From what I understand, the governance part of the IETF is done by the IETF LLC.  

I guess it depends on your interpretation of governance, but as I said in my other mail I don’t think the IETF LLC has to do with the IETF’s governance, which is done by the community itself.

> The draft does not get into IETF LLC matters.  A person conversant with corporate affairs would likely understand the legal aspects of that.
> 
> The proposal does not mention the word "dysfunctional".  This is a sentence from Section 2.2: 'Restricting signatories to those who are "nomcom qualified" disenfranchises active remote participants who reside in emerging countries as they lack the extensive travel resources required to seek redress’.

People who participate exclusively remotely are disenfranchised from seeking redress in a number of ways, not limited to the recall process. If the community views the disenfranchisement of remote participants from seeking redress as a problem to be rectified, it would be useful to know that and to use it to guide solution discussions.

> 
> As for reputational risk, does the reputation of a person who can afford to spend USD 10,000 outweigh the reputation of a person who actively participates even though he or she does not attend IETF meetings?

I don’t understand the premise of this question. My point is that I believe the key reason the recall process does not get used is because it creates reputational risk for the petitioners. Changing the pool of potential petitioners, assuming they would still be IETF participants, wouldn’t change this for individual petitioners.

> 
>> The proposal in this draft can also be trivially gamed by a single or small handful of individuals creating a set of 10 email accounts, registering them to participate remotely, and having them join remote sessions. Even if all this would result in is a series of recall committees being forced to be constituted to deal with recall petitions that get rejected, this could be a significant tax on our community. I think analyzing the countervailing benefits of this proposal against this tax or analyzing the costs and benefits of doing identity verification to overcome it are important tasks that would require the kind of discussion a WG can provide, and also require a clear understanding of what the problem statement is.
> 
> Does the above mean that the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) is aware that BCP 78/79 can be easily "gamed”?

No. As I said in my mail, I was only speaking for myself. And I made no comment on BCP 78 or 79.

Alissa

> 
> Regards,
> S. Moonesamy