[Emu] Proposal: SASL over EAP

Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl> Thu, 16 April 2020 17:38 UTC

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Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 19:38:35 +0200
From: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: [Emu] Proposal: SASL over EAP
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Hello,

I think SASL over EAP would be useful.  Would it be in scope for EMU?

SASL is normally used for applications, while EAP authenticates
networks.  However, with VPNs these uses get mixed.

We're making a few other changes to SASL that line up with this:
 - Diameter embedding of SASL tokens
 - A SASL mech "SXOVER" to support authentication of foreign realms

An interesting usecase for EAP-SASL with all this would be WiFi and LAN
authentication (EAPOL or 802.1x) passed over Diameter to *any* domain on
the Internet, and receiving back tunnel information.  Clients would be
tunneled to their own network/IP/routing and it would be easier for
public access providers to offer full networking without worry about the
behaviour it outputs over their IP range.

This may in fact be a path for your purpose of out-of-band based
authentication; SASL mechanisms could use such extensions too and SXOVER
might help to protect the general mechanism.


Before this group existed I wrote a spec for EAP-SASL, is it worthwhile
to continue, and how/what do you advise?
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-vanrein-eap-sasl-00.txt

The other work is progressing in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vanrein-diameter-sasl-03


Looking forward to the EMU opinions,


Kind regards,

Rick van Rein
InternetWide.org