[Emu] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC9190 (7577)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Sat, 29 July 2023 23:07 UTC

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Subject: [Emu] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC9190 (7577)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC9190,
"EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7577

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>

Section: 2.5

Original Text
-------------
   When an EAP-TLS server has successfully processed the TLS client
   Finished and sent its last handshake message (Finished or a post-
   handshake message), it sends an encrypted TLS record with application
   data 0x00.  The encrypted TLS record with application data 0x00 is a
   protected success result indication, as defined in [RFC3748] ...


Corrected Text
--------------
(append)

If the EAP-TLS peer does not see the protected success indication, it
MUST behave as if it had received an EAP Failure instead.

Notes
-----
This is largely a nit, but it's reasonable to say this.

The existing text discussed what the server must do,  But it does not say what the
peer does if the server fails to behave this way,

Instructions:
-------------
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--------------------------------------
RFC9190 (draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-21)
--------------------------------------
Title               : EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3
Publication Date    : February 2022
Author(s)           : J. Preuß Mattsson, M. Sethi
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : EAP Method Update
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG