Re: [Emu] on draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-bind-00

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Sam Hartman
> Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2012 11:06 AM
> To: zhou.sujing@zte.com.cn
> Cc: hartmans-ietf@mit.edu; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] on draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-bind-00
> 
> >>>>> "zhou" == zhou sujing <zhou.sujing@zte.com.cn> writes:
> 
>     zhou> To my understanding, right prior to finishing tunnel
establishement,
> EAP peer
>     zhou> and EAP Server(print server in the server insertion attack case)
> should have
>     zhou> exchanged channel binding with integrity protection by key only
> known to EAP
>     zhou> peer and EAP server (MSK in this case),
> 
> well, I actually think this happens after tunnel establishment and after
the
> inner method.
> So,  after the print server learns the MSK.
> As I read draft-ietf-emu-chbind nothing forbids this. Certainly the
existing
> implementations of channel binding I'm aware of work that way.

I think that as I understand it, it would occur before the MSK has been
computed.  An "intermediate" value has been computed but a new channel
binding method could be defined that adds to the MSK and other EAP methods
could be run after the channel binding has been done.

Jim

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