Re: [Emu] EAP-GPSK: Ciphersuites

Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net> Mon, 28 August 2006 19:41 UTC

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Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2006 20:31:41 +0200
From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
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To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Emu] EAP-GPSK: Ciphersuites
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Hi Joe,

we might want to ask ourself why IKEv2 guys have chosen the indicated 
list of algorithms and why we decide to use different onces.

If we think that their list represents a problem we might want to 
convince them to submit an updated version of RFC 4307.

Ciao
Hannes

Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) schrieb:
> Is the proposal to make 3DES mandatory and AES optional? 
> It seems that we should be moving toward AES.  Since this is a new
> method it may be better to make AES mandatory and 3DES optional.    
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net] 
>> Sent: Tuesday, August 22, 2006 2:20 AM
>> To: M. Vanderveen
>> Cc: emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Emu] EAP-GPSK: Ciphersuites
>>
>> Hi
>>
>> let us for a moment assume that RFC 4307 makes some 
>> reasonable algorithm choices (we are talking about IKEv2 
>> here). If we take the text and apply it to EAP-GPSK then we 
>> would produce something like:
>>
>> Conservative Choice:
>> -----------------------
>>
>> (Integrity)
>>        AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96        2            [RFC2404]            MUST
>>
>> (Encryption)
>>        ENCR_3DES                3         [RFC2451]       MUST-
>>
>> (Key Derivation)
>>        PRF_HMAC_SHA1       2          [RFC2104]    MUST
>>
>> (Note that there is no MUST for encryption algorithms specified in RFC
>> 4307.)
>>
>>
>> Choice for the Future:
>> -----------------------
>>
>> (Encryption)
>>       ENCR_AES_CBC             12        [AES-CBC]       SHOULD+
>>
>> (Integrity)
>>       AUTH_AES_XCBC_96         5         [AES-MAC]       SHOULD+
>>
>> (Key Derivation)
>>        PRF_AES128_CBC      4          [AESPRF]     SHOULD+
>>
>> Does this sound like a terrible bad idea?
>>
>> Ciao
>> Hannes
>>
>> M. Vanderveen schrieb:
>>> Both are pretty popular. Why not list them both? As for 
>> which one to be 
>>> mandatory to implement, someone should to a search through 
>> other systems 
>>> (e.g. IEEE, IPSec) and see which one is most popular.
>>>
>>> */Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>/* wrote:
>>>
>>>     Hi all,
>>>
>>>     the current version of the document
>>>     
>> http://tools.ietf.org/wg/emu/draft-clancy-emu-eap-shared-secret-01.txt
>>>     still supports AES-EAX:
>>>
>>>     
>> +-----------+----+-------------+---------------+--------------------+
>>>     | CSuite/ | KS | Encryption | Integrity | Key Derivation |
>>>     | Specifier | | | | Function |
>>>     
>> +-----------+----+-------------+---------------+--------------------+
>>>     | 0x000001 | 16 | AES-EAX-128 | AES-CMAC-128 | GKDF-128 |
>>>     
>> +-----------+----+-------------+---------------+--------------------+
>>>     At the IETF#66 EMU meeting AES CCM was suggested.
>>>
>>>     Later, it got the impression that AES-CBC was more 
>> appreciated. Should
>>>     we update the draft with AES-CBC?
>>>
>>>     Ciao
>>>     Hannes
>>>
>>>
>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>     Emu mailing list
>>>     Emu@ietf.org
>>>     https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>>>
>>>
>>>
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> 
> 


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