Re: [Emu] server unauthenticated provisioning mode

["Dan Harkins" <[e-mail]>]

On Thu, August 25, 2011 11:27 pm, Glen Zorn wrote:
> On 8/26/2011 1:13 PM, Dan Harkins wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thu, August 25, 2011 10:32 pm, Glen Zorn wrote:
>>> On 8/26/2011 4:22 AM, Dan Harkins wrote:
>>>
>>>>> 3) I think MSCHAPv2 is an entirely inappropriate MTI for this
>>>>> mechanism. I brought that up as an example about how under certain
>>>>> conditions the fact that something is the kind of thing the IETF
>>>>> standardizes but is never the less informational should not block a
>>>>> downward reference. I was attempting to explain my thinking on the
>>>>> process issue to you, not to suggest MSCHAPv2 for this document.
>>>>> Apparently I failed to explain my thinking on the process issue.
>>>>
>>>>   I completely missed that. Sorry. But if the IETF standardized a
>>>> wholly inappropriate protocol like MSCHAPv2 (it doesn't even generate
>>>> a
>>>> shared key)
>>>
>>> Please check your sources & refrain from spouting nonsense; if EAP-pwd
>>> is really so wonderful you shouldn't need to disparage other work, it
>>> should stand on its own merit.
>>
>>   I stand corrected. That must be why draft-zorn-emu-team proposed using
>> MSCHAPv2. Oh wait, it didn't. It proposed using EAP-pwd.
>
> & this has a relation to your misrepresentation  how?

  It doesn't really, it was a reference to your implication that EAP-pwd
cannot stand on its own merit, and requires the disparagement of other
work to prop it up. Which I think we can both agree is not the case.

  Anyway, yes I misrepresented MSCHAPv2. It does produce a key. I was
wrong.

  But I still think the statement that MSCHAPv2 is inappropriate for
doing server unauthenticated provisioning mode is valid even with a
secret key output by MSCHAPv2. I hope we can both agree on that too.

  Dan.