[Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01): the case for adoption ahead of IETF 127
Alan DeKok <alan.dekok@inkbridge.io> Thu, 12 November 2026 14:37 UTC
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From: Alan DeKok <alan.dekok@inkbridge.io>
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:37:32 -0500
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Subject: [Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01): the case for adoption ahead of IETF 127
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On Nov 12, 2026, at 6:22 AM, gfeige@innottank.net wrote: > Distributing them—even if housed in secure memory formats—decentralizes the attack surface. Centralized HSS/UDMs protect these algorithms not just with hardware, but with network-level rate limiting and anomaly detection to prevent parameter brute-forcing. Placing this real-time derivation capability at the edge inherently bypasses those safeguards. +1 Distributing keys is hard. Both operationally, and for security reasons. > Second, the roaming and settlement paradox. If a Hotspot or venue operator is providing preferential treatment or QoS to a specific MNO's user, they are doing so under the expectation of a roaming agreement and subsequent charging capability. In standard roaming scenarios, the Home MNO actively authenticates the user in real-time, establishing undeniable proof of presence. With EAP-WSIM's offline local authentication, the Home network remains entirely blind to the session. When the venue operator submits billing records for the session, the Home MNO has no independent verification that their subscriber was actually present or authenticated. Without that verifiable real-time authentication trail, validating billing records becomes highly problematic and raises legitimate concerns about usurpation. I agree. One possibility is that when WSIM is used, the venue still sends Accounting-Request packets to the Home MNO, with the original User-Name. This is likely not too hard. It would also then be necessary for the venue to receive Disconnect-Request packets, so that the Home MNO could disconnect users. Without those associated requirements, it will likely be difficult for operators to support something like WSIM. Alan DeKok.
- [Emu] EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01): the… Praveen Gupta
- [Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01):… gfeige@innottank.net
- [Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01):… gfeige@innottank.net
- [Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01):… Praveen Gupta
- [Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01):… gfeige@innottank.net
- [Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01):… Praveen Gupta
- [Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01):… gfeige@innottank.net
- [Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01):… Praveen Gupta
- [Emu] Re: EAP-WSIM (draft-gupta-emu-eap-wsim-01):… Alan DeKok
- [Emu] draft-wan-emu-aka-prime-identity-fragmentat… Tao Wan
- [Emu] Re: draft-wan-emu-aka-prime-identity-fragme… Tao Wan
- [Emu] Re: draft-wan-emu-aka-prime-identity-fragme… Tao Wan