Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART telechat review of draft-ietf-rtcweb-use-cases-and-requirements-14.txt
Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net> Thu, 15 May 2014 14:31 UTC
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From: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>
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Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 16:31:29 +0200
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To: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
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Cc: General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-rtcweb-use-cases-and-requirements.all@tools.ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART telechat review of draft-ietf-rtcweb-use-cases-and-requirements-14.txt
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Brian: Thank your for your detailed review. Authors: Any responses? (I personally think at least the first comment deserves a change in the document.) >> The following considerations are applicable to all use cases: >> >> o Clients can be on IPv4-only >> >> o Clients can be on IPv6-only >> >> o Clients can be on dual-stack > > It isn't clear whether this is intended to include the case where an > IPv4-only client communicates with an IPv6-only node (or vice versa). > > It also isn't clear about cases in which a mobile client's connectivity > changes dynamically during a session (e.g. from IPv4 to IPv6). This is > partly clarified later by F17, but only partly. I'd suggest expanding the last bullet of Section 3.1 to include various translation designs that might be involved in Ipv4-IPv6 connectivity. Eg., OLD: o Clients can be on networks with a NAT using any type of Mapping and Filtering behaviors (as described in RFC4787). NEW: o Clients can be on networks with a NAT or IPv4-IPv6 translation devices using any type of Mapping and Filtering behaviors (as described in RFC4787). >> o Clients can be on networks with a NAT using any type of Mapping >> and Filtering behaviors (as described in RFC4787). > > That document is scoped for UDP only. Is that sufficient? As I understand the > RTCWEB transport drafts, it is aiming at connection-oriented transport. > (How many NATs support SCTP, for example?) I thought that any SCTP would be encapsulated within UDP fro that reason. > >> 3.2. Common requirements >> >> The requirements retrived from the Simple Video Communication Service >> use-case (Section 3.3.1) by default apply to all other use-cases, and >> are considred common. For each individual use-case, only the >> additional requirements are listed. > > In fact you duplicate the additional requirements in each use case where they > occur. That seems like overkill. Also there's at least one mix-up as a result, > noted below. > >> 3.3.1.2. Common Requirements > ... >> F3 Transmitted streams and data must be rate >> controlled (meaning that the browser must, regardless >> of application behavior, reduce send rate when >> there is congestion). > > I think that needs to be broken into two more atomic requirements. > Something like > > F3.1 There must be a mechanism by which the transport layer > can signal the occurrence of congestion to the browser. > > F3.2 Transmitted streams and data must be rate > controlled (meaning that the browser must, regardless > of application behavior, reduce send rate while > there is congestion). > > The change from "when" to "while" is intentional, since the browser > should allow the rate to increase when there is no congestion. I agree with the when=>while change, good catch. Not sure personally if the breakdown to smaller requirements is necessary. > >> F11 It must be possible to protect streams and data >> from wiretapping [RFC2804]. > > I don't see the relevance of the reference (of which I am a co-author), > which mainly states that the IETF won't consider requirements *for* wiretapping. > I'm sure you can find a reference that says encryption is a Good Thing. Agreed. I do not think this is a blocking comment, but I too would like to see a difference reference. > >> F14 The browser must make it possible to set up a >> call between two parties without one party >> learning the other party's host IP address. > > It is not clear how to interpret that. I assume it's supposed to be a > restatement of the earlier comment: > >> The application gives the users the opportunity to stop it from >> exposing the host IP address to the application of the other user. > > But -- assuming the implementation model is peer-to-peer communication > between the two hosts, rather than client1-server-client2 communication -- > I'm afraid I don't see how F14 can be guaranteed, since the peers must be > aware of each others' IP address. Even if the browser and app hide the > remote address, a little Wiresharking will reveal it immediately. > There's not much point stating a requirement that cannot be met. > > I realised at this point in the document that you need to be very > explicit about whether communication is indeed intended to be peer-to-peer > or via the server. And assuming it is meant to be peer-to-peer, what > is the model for the rendez-vous between the peers? What requirements do > you need to solve the resulting referral problem? > (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-carpenter-referral-ps-02) > > This topic belongs in the Common Requirements. > >> 3.3.7.1. Description > ... >> The user in the previous use case that starts a trip is behind a >> common residential router that supports prioritization of traffic. > > Please talk about differentiated services (RFC 2474 etc.). IP doesn't > have simple priority. That's exactly why the DART WG was just formed. I agree that DS would be a more appropriate term, but I don't think the document should otherwise expand too much on that space, IMO. > >> 3.3.7.2. Additional Requirements >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >> REQ-ID DESCRIPTION >> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >> F17 The communication session must survive across a >> change of the network interface used by the >> session >> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >> F22 The browser must be able to receive streams and >> data from multiple peers concurrently. >> ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > This seems completely messed up. The reader expects requirements for > QoS at this point. Isn't this "F22" really F24? > >> 3.3.10.2. Additional Requirements >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >> REQ-ID DESCRIPTION >> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >> F22 The browser should be able to take advantage >> of available capabilities (supplied by network >> nodes) to prioritize voice, video and data >> appropriately. > > Again, please cite differentiated services rather than prioritization. > Also, you now have two different F22s. This one seems to fit 3.3.7.2 better. > > Below, you also have two F25s. And other duplicates. Wasn't the idea > just to add *new* requirements when they arose? As F22 shows, the > duplication is error-prone. > >> 6. Security Considerations > > I am really surprised that there isn't a sub-section on Privacy > Considerations. RFC 6973 describes the various types of threat and they > seem specially relevant here. Jari
- [Gen-art] Gen-ART telechat review of draft-ietf-r… Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART telechat review of draft-ie… Jari Arkko