Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC review: draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-privacy-03

Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> Mon, 15 February 2016 21:15 UTC

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To: Tomek Mrugalski <tomasz.mrugalski@gmail.com>, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "dhcwg@ietf.org" <dhcwg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-privacy.all@ietf.org
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From: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
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Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:15:18 -0600
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC review: draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-privacy-03
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Hi Tomek -

Thanks for these edits. My points are all addressed, though I wish to 
push a little more on changing the focus of the following in the document:

On 2/15/16 2:45 PM, Tomek Mrugalski wrote:

<snip/>
>
>> In section 4.3, the paragraph on Random allocation comments on the
>> poor performance of a specific simplistic implementation of random
>> selection. More efficient algorithms exist. But the discussion is
>> mostly irrelevant to the document. Please simplify this paragraph to
>> focus on the benefits of random allocation.
> I somewhat disagree. First, there are more efficient algorithms known,
> but they are not always used. This document is a analysis, so we tried
> to provide an analysis of what's actually happening in actual
> implementations. In an ideal world where privacy is the top priority
> every implementation would use truly random allocation using hardware
> entropy generators. Sadly, the reality of DHCP servers market is that
> performance matters a lot. Lowered performance is a price for better
> privacy. This fact directly affects DHCP server implementors, which are
> the target audience for this document. These are my arguments why the
> discussion about performance penalty is there and should stay in my opinion.
Then I suggest this variation:

"In deployed systems, address allocation strategies such as choosing the 
next
sequentially available address are chosen over strategies such as 
pseudo-random
allocation across the available address pool because the latter are more 
difficult
to implement efficiently."

To be very clear (and I do _not_ want to put this discussion in the 
document), an implementation could keep a structure (probably a 
linked-list) of blocks of unallocated addresses, and very efficiently 
select an address pseudo-randomly from the addresses in that structure, 
modifying the structure to make the next selection just as efficient 
(similarly modifying the structure when addresses are returned to the pool).
This would not have the performance degradation that the simple strategy 
you currently discuss has.
While they're entertaining, I think discussing _either_ way of 
approaching such a random selection algorithm distracts the reader from 
the point of understanding the privacy implications.
>
>

<snip/>


RjS