[Gen-art] ***SPAM*** 8.788 (5) Re: Gen-art LC review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc3530bis-33

[Tom Haynes <[e-mail]>]

Hi Elwyn,

Before I forget, thanks for the review.

I have replied inline for the changes I have made or have a question on.

Tom

> On Nov 11, 2014, at 12:48 PM, Elwyn Davies <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> 
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> 
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
> you may receive.
> 
> Document: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc3530bis-33.txt
> Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
> Review Date: 2014-11-06
> IETF LC End Date: 2014-10-06
> IESG Telechat date: 2014-12-04
> 
> Summary:
> Much more ready than last time I reviewed this draft!  There are a few issues at the borderline between editorial and minor plus quite a lot of editorial nits.
> 
> Major Issues:
> 
> Minor Issues:
> s8.8.1:  I suspect that this section should have been deleted when s7.7 was deleted between v26 and v27.  The references to various server class attributes (handle class, change class, etc) are orphaned with no definitions of these items

I’m fine with deleting this section.




> 
> -----------------------------------------
> 
> Handling of wrap around of seqid4 variables:

David will reply with to the seqid4 issues.

> ============================================
> The specification of how variables/fields of type seqid4 are incremented and compared, dealing with wrap around is very messy.
> Currently there are two separate descriptions of handling wrap around when a seqid4 variable is incremented through NFS4_UINT32_MAX (which turns out to be the all ones binary pattern.  The descriptions are slightly different but not incompatible.
> The following text appears in s9.1.6
>>   Since the sequence number is represented with an unsigned 32-bit
>>   integer, the arithmetic involved with the sequence number is mod
>>   2^32.  Note that when the seqid wraps, it SHOULD bypass zero and use
>>   one as the next seqid value.  For an example of modulo arithmetic
>>   involving sequence numbers see [RFC0793].
> and s9.1.3.2 has:
>>   This pattern continues until the seqid is incremented past
>>   NFS4_UINT32_MAX, and one (not zero) SHOULD be the next seqid value.
>>   The purpose of the incrementing of the seqid is to allow the server
>>   to communicate to the client the order in which operations that
>>   modified locking state associated with a stateid have been processed.
>> 
>>   In making comparisons between seqids, both by the client in
>>   determining the order of operations and by the server in determining
>>   whether the NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID is to be returned, the possibility of
>>   the seqid being swapped around past the NFS4_UINT32_MAX value needs
>>   to be taken into account.
>> 
> The definition of the seqid4 type in s2.1 doesn't mention this sort of constraint.
> 
> Incrementing of seqid4 type fields is mentioned in a number of sections along with special values (including 0):
> s9.1.3.1, bullet 1 (also bullet 2):
>>                Such stateids are subject
>>      to change (with consequent incrementing of the stateid's seqid) in
>>      response to OPENs that result in upgrade and OPEN_DOWNGRADE
>>      operations.
> 
> s9.1.3.3: Refers to special values of seqid (all zeroes, all ones)
> 
> s9.1.3.4, two bullets before last bullet have:
>>   o  If the "seqid" field is not zero, and it is greater than the
>>      current sequence value corresponding the current "other" field,
>>      return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc3530bis
>> 
>>   o  If the "seqid" field is less than the current sequence value
>>      corresponding the current "other" field, return
>>      NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID.
>> 
> 
> s9.11, last para:
>>   The "seqid" value in the returned stateid
>>   MUST be incremented, even in situations in which there is no change
>>   to the access and deny bits for the file.
> 
> s15.8.5, para 3 before last:
>>   In this case, the
>>   stateid returned as an "other" field that matches that of the
>>   previous open while the "seqid" field is incremented to reflect the
>>   change status due to the new open.
>> 
> It would be much cleaner if the texts from s9.1.3.2 and s9.1.6 were merged, probably into a section just after 2.1 (say s2.1.1) together draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc3530biswith mention of the special values.  If this is done, s2.1.1 can then be referenced wherever a seqid is mentioned as being incremented.
> 
> Also, I cannot see why the current texts use SHOULD.  I am pretty certain that skipping 0 and going to 1 from NFS4_UINT32_MAX is a MUST. If it isn't a MUST, what alternative scheme will make the wrap around work without both client and server knowing what scheme is being used? This is at least partly implied by the definition of NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID in s13.1.8.2 which indicates that both ends have a common idea of what the next expected number ought to be..
> 
> -----------------------------------
> 
> change_info4:  Wrap around in before and after fields.
> ======================================================
> I assume that it is deemed that using a 64 bit number as changeid4 should obviate the need for dealing with wrap around.  However I don't think there is any advice on starting values for the change values - some strategies (e.g., random values) could result in change indicators starting uncomfortably close to the maximum value and running up against wrap around.  A brief note on this would be desirable.
> 
> —————————————————


<— to here —>


> 
> s10.7: Informing the server that a file is being memory mapped.
> Is there a mechanism? If not should there be (e.g., a flag on OPEN)?


I stumbled on this as well, until I noticed this:

   o  If there is an application on the server that has memory mapped a
      file that a client is also accessing, the client may not be able
      to get a consistent value of the change attribute to determine
      whether its cache is stale or not.
I.e., the server only knows about locally memory mapped files.



> 
> -----------------------------------
> 
> s15.2.3, paras 4 and 7: The last sentence in para 7 that implies NFS4ERR_MINOR_VERSION_MISMATCH takes priority over all others appears to be incompatible with the second XDR decoding strategy in para 4.  If decoding of the operation array is interleaved with performing the requested operations then it seems possible that the COMPOUND may be terminated by an earlier error before the offending operation 2 is reached, so that it would never be decoded.  Further, I don't understand why operation 2 is singled out for special discussion here, other than maybe to say that it is available for future use.  

I think it is just because it is reserved for future use with minor versioning.

I.e., other operations having values might also be bad, but if they do, we can assume it is because they are not involved with minor versioning.


> How does it differ from any other value that is not supported by the minorversion implemented by the server?  Why should the base version be singled out for special treatment?
> 
> Nits/editorial comments:
> ========================
> 
> Requirements Language note (after Abstract): The terms REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED are overloaded in this document, in that they are used both in the RFC 2119 sense and as adjectives that characterize attributes. It would be a good idea to avoid confusion by providing an extension of the usual form of words in this section, such as:
> NEW:
>   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
>   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
>   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]
>   except where "REQUIRED" and "RECOMMENDED" are used as qualifiers
>   to distinguish classes of attributes as described in Sections
>   1.3.5.2 and 5.
> 

Agreed


> 
> General: There are a small number of instances where the form '<name> recommended attribute' and similar is used.  It would be clearer to use 'RECOMMENDED attribute in these cases:
> - s15.17.5, next to last para.
> - s15.37.5, next to last para.
> - s2.2.7

Agreed

> 
> s1.3.3.2: Worth reinforcing that attribute names are (presumably) encoded in utf8 as they are just fileobject names.


I’m not sure that strictly follows - see S 12.8 for example.

Indeed, it is conceivable that in different parts of the name space of the server, different character sets are possible (because of different underlying file systems). That has the corollary that moving a filesystem object may result in an error because the target rejects the name.


> 
> s1.3.4:  A pointer to s9.9 for an explanation 'share semantics' would be very useful.  Copying the first para of s9.9 or something similar to the terminology section would also help.

I’m good with the pointer.


> 
> s1.4, Definition of 'Lease', para 2:
> OLD:
>      All leases granted by a server have the same fixed interval.  Note
>      that the fixed interval was chosen to alleviate the expense a
>      server would have in maintaining state about variable length
>      leases across server failures.
> NEW:
>      All leases granted by a server have the same fixed duration.  Note
>      that the fixed interval duration was chosen to alleviate the
>      expense a
>      server would have in maintaining state relating to variable length
>      leases across server failures.


Agreed

> 
> s1,4, Definition of Stateid:  Definitions of open-owner and lock-owner would be helpful.  The terms are used a few times before they are defined in s9.


Agreed:

        <t hangText="Lock-Owner:">
          Each byte-range lock is associated with a specific lock-owner 
          and an open-owner.  The lock-owner consists of a
          Client ID and an opaque owner string.
          The client presents this to the server to establish
          the ownership of the byte-range lock as needed.
        </t>

        <t hangText="Open-Owner:">
          Each open file is associated with a specific open-owner,
          which consists of a Client ID and an opaque owner string.
          The client presents this to the server to establish
          the ownership of the open as needed.
        </t>


> 
> s2: Useful to add a reminder that the size constants and definitive definitions can be found in [RFCNFSv4XDR].

Agreed

> 
> s2.1:  Should this have typedef opaque linktext4<>; instead of
>       typedef opaque linktext4; ?


Yes, this is already fixed in draft 34

> 
> s2.2.5: s/mandatory/REQUIRED/

Agreed

> 
> s2.2.10:
> OLD:
>   The r_netid and
>   r_addr fields respectively contain a netid and uaddr.  The netid and
>   uaddr concepts are defined in [RFC5665].  The netid and uaddr formats
>   for TCP over IPv4 and TCP over IPv6 are defined in [RFC5665],
> NEW:
>   The r_netid and r_addr fields respectively contain a network id and
>   universal address.  The network id  and universal address concepts
>   together with formats for them with TCP over IPv4 and TCP over IPv6
>   are defined in [RFC5665],
> 


Agreed


> s3.3: The terms 'policy boundary' and 'crossing policy boundaries' are used in subsequent sections but not explicitly defined.  I assume that they refer to the client accessing fileobjects in areas accessed via the different entry points referred to in s3.3.  Assuming I am right introducing the 'policy boundary' term in s3.3 would be helpful.

The document strives very hard not to discuss export mechanisms:

kitty:linux loghyr$ more /etc/exports
/ *(rw)
/home/loghyr *(rw)
/pynfs *(rw,no_root_squash,no_all_squash,insecure)
/public *(rw,no_root_squash,no_all_squash,insecure)

Each one of these define a “policy boundary” in the namespace.

OLD:

In general, the client will not have to use
   the SECINFO operation except during initial communication with the
   server or when the client crosses policy boundaries at the server.
   It is possible that the server's policies change during the client's
   interaction therefore forcing the client to negotiate a new security
   triple.


NEW:

In general, the client will not have to use
   the SECINFO operation except during initial communication with the
   server or when the client encounters a new security policy as the
   client navigates the name space.  Either condition will force the
   client to negotiate a new security triple.


> 
> s3.3.3, para 1: s/the security flavor the original SETCLIENTID/the security flavor of the original SETCLIENTID/

Agreed

> 
> s4.2.3, para 2: s/mandatory/REQUIRED/


Agreed

> 
> s5.3:  I think it would be worth being explicit as to whether hard links can be created between named attribute fileobjects either (1) for named attributes of the same fileobject and/or (2) for two different fileobjects on the same file system.  Is it also the case that if the basic file system supports hard links (link_support == TRUE) then it will necessarily support hard links between named attributes?  As I understand it, the named attribute system in NFSv4 was modelled on Solaris v9+ and the extended attribute system in Linux would probably not support hard links (I haven't tried them (yet)) even if the Solaris version does.... Later... I see from s13.1.4.14 (NFS4ERR_XDEV) that hard links between different named attribute directories are NOT allowed.  It would be good to make this explicit here in s5.3.  This still leaves the question of whether hard links are allowed in a single named attribute directory.  I can't see a lot of use for this capability but it should be explicitly allowed or disallowed as appropriate.

This is not addressed in 3530, but it is in 5661 (section 18.9.3), which is equivalent to 15.29.5 in 3530bis:

Shepler, et al.              Standards Track                  [Page 425]
^L
RFC 5661                         NFSv4.1                    January 2010


   On some servers, "." and ".." are illegal values for newname and the
   error NFS4ERR_BADNAME will be returned if they are specified.

   When the current filehandle designates a named attribute directory
   and the object to be linked (the saved filehandle) is not a named
   attribute for the same object, the error NFS4ERR_XDEV MUST be
   returned.  When the saved filehandle designates a named attribute and
   the current filehandle is not the appropriate named attribute
   directory, the error NFS4ERR_XDEV MUST also be returned.

I.e., it implies that if the current filehandle is the appropriate named attribute
directory, the LINK is okay.

We could either explicitly state in Section 5.3 that hard links are legal here or
change the LINK IMPLEMENTATION Section to follow that of 5661.

I am partial to syncing the two sections. Any concern?

> 
> s5.6: There is no definition of nfs_lease4 in either this draft or the xdr draft.


So nfs_lease4 is in RFC3530, but again with no corresponding XDR.

5661 has it fixed.

Okay, the xdr draft now has a fix for it. Great catch!


> 
> s5.8.2.14: Presumably this is hard links: s/links/hard links/;  I assume that the number of symlinks is essentially unconstrained.

Agreed

> 
> s5.10, last para: it would be a good idea to add a note to the RFC Editor to ensure that the statements about the Unicode version will be true on publication!
> 

OK

> s5.10, last para: Is it conceivable that a client would need to know what version of Unicode a server was using ?

No

>  If so should there be a way for the client to find out what version of Unicode is in use by the server?

<Shudder />

> 
> s6.1:
>>      *  Setting only the mode attribute should provide reasonable
>>         security.  For example, setting a mode of 000 should be enough
>>         to ensure that future opens for read or write by any principal
>>         fail, regardless of a previously existing or inherited ACL.
> I think this may only apply to non-privileged principals - root can still read/write *ix files with mode 0.  Tie in with last para of s6.3.1.1.


Which is why this is a “should” and not a “SHOULD” or a “MUST”?



> 
> s6.2.1, next to last para: I suppose SMB really ought to have a reference.

OK

> 
> ????? s6.2.1.3, last para:  The "optional" and "RECOMMENDED" should be in the same case - I think this should be both upper case RFC 2119 requirements but it is arguable they should both be lower.

We removed this in version 34 of the draft.


> 
> s6.4.3:  It is (still) not clear (at least, to me) how inheritance is supposed to apply to named attribute directories.  The named attribute directory has the file object to which it applies as its 'parent' rather than an ordinary directory.  Presumably inheritance would apply from the named attribute directory to the named attributes created in it - but are ACLs always supported on named attributes and the named attribute directory if they are suported on ordinary files and directories?


David??

> 
> s7.8, para 1:  I am unable to parse the 3rd sentence in this para:
>>   However, with the support of multiple security mechanisms
>>   and the ability to negotiate the appropriate use of these mechanisms,
>>   the server is unable to properly determine if a client will be able
>>   to authenticate itself.
> 
> 


And the authors of 5661 seem to agree. It is also S7.8 in that document.

What the sentence means is that since the server has no way to determine
how the client will authenticate in the presence of multiple security mechanisms,
it should as 5661 states:

   Because NFSv4 clients possess the ability to change the security
   mechanisms used, after determining what is allowed, by using SECINFO
   and SECINFO_NONAME, the server SHOULD NOT present a different view of
   the namespace based on the security mechanism being used by a client.
   Instead, it should present a consistent view and return
   NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC if an attempt is made to access data with an
   inappropriate security mechanism.

I’d be willing to pull Section 7.8 from 5661 back to 3530bis - besides using
security policy as a term, it appears easier to read. :-)



> 
> s8: s/OPTIONAL/optional/ - using multi-server namespaces  is a user choice not a protocol requirement.

ok


> 
> s8.5:
>>   If a single location entry designates multiple server IP addresses,
>>   the client cannot assume that these addresses are multiple paths to
>>   the same server.  In most cases, they will be, but the client MUST
>>   verify that before acting on that assumption.
> Is there some means in NFSv4 to do this?  I couldn't see that there was.  I guess one could use Reverse DNS.  If an out-of-band verification is needed, this should be made explicit.

The client could access each IP address and examine the resulting ClientID from each.

But even then, I think that is not sufficient.  David?


> 
> s8.8: Copying the structure definitions from ss2.2.6/2.2.7 is unnecessary and could be better handled with refs.

ok

> 
> s8.8.1, first and second bullets:
> [This comment is redundant if s8.8.1 gets deleted as suggested in Minor Issues above.]
>>   o  All listed file system instances should be considered as of the
>>      same handle class if and only if the current fh_expire_type
>>      attribute does not include the FH4_VOL_MIGRATION bit.
> What if fh_expire_type has FH_VOLATILE_ANY set?  This is defined in s4.2.3 to imply FH4_VOL_MIGRATION making the 'setting of FH4_VOL_MIGRATION redundant'. The same issue applies to the second bullet.


Ahh, deleted!


> 
> s9.1.1, 2nd para after 2nd set if bullets (near the bottom of p98):
> s/the client for purpose/the client for the purpose/

ok

> 
> s9.1.1, last para: forward refs to the sections defining SETCLIENTID and SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM would be helpful.

ok


> 
> s9.1.3.1:s/of guarantee/of a guarantee/

ok

> 
> s9.1.5, para 2 and elsewhere in s9; also s10.4.1:
>> If no state is established by the client, either
>>   byte-range lock or share reservation, a stateid of all bits 0 is
>>   used.
> Does this differ from the 'anonymous stateid' defined in s9.1.3.3?  If not it would be better to refer to it by this title.  There are a number of other places in s9 where the expressions like 'stateid of all 0s/1s' are used.  It would be more consistent to use the 'anonymous' and 'READ bypass' titles set up in s9.1.3.3 in all cases.


David...

> 
> s9.1.9, para 3:
>>   In any event, the server is able to safely release state-owner state
>>   (in the sense that retransmitted requests will not be erroneously
>>   acted upon) when the state-owner no currently being utilized by the
>                          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>   client (i.e., there are no open files associated with an open-owner
>>   and no lock stateids associated with a lock-owner).
> Maybe 'state-owner is not currently’?


Yes, I had to go back to RFC3530 to see why this was ever right. But in
the current form, your suggestion is correct.


> 
> s9.1.9, para 3:
> OLD:
>> However, the period it chooses to hold
>>   this state is implementation specific.
> 
> NEW:
>> However, the period for which it chooses to hold
>>   this state is implementation specific.

ok

> 
> s9.1.10, para 1:
> s/the sequence number may have any value./the sequence number may have any valid (i.e., non-zero) value./


ok

> 
> s9.1.10, last para:
>> thus can ensure that
>>   confirmation will not be required.
> s/ensure/be confident/

ok

> 
> s9.2 (2 places),s10.5,s13.1.8.8: s/lock owner/lock-owner/ (total of 4 instances)  - might be others at ends of lines that I missed.

ok

> 
> s8.6 (4 places), s9.6.1: s/open owner/open-owner/ (total of 5 instances)

ok

> 
> s9.6.3.1, 2nd bullet: s?IO?I/O?

ok

> 
> s9.6.3.1, 3rd bullet: s/haled as courtesy/haled as a courtesy/

also s/haled/held/


> 
> s9.8, para 5:
>> The client may accomplish this task by
>>   issuing an I/O request, either a pending I/O or a zero-length read,
>>   specifying the stateid associated with the lock in question.
> How do you issue a "pending I/O request”??


I think the intent is one that was pending or if none were pending, fake it with a zero-length read.


> 
> s9.14.4, title: s/Lease_time/lease_time/

ok

> 
> s10.2.1, para 9:
>>   Note that the requirement stated above is not meant to imply that
>>   when the client is no longer obliged, as required above, to retain
>>   delegation information, that it should necessarily dispose of it.
>>   Some specific cases are:
> I think this para is referring to the server rather than the client: s/client/server/.

Dave, can you look at this one?

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/nfsv4/current/msg10668.html <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/nfsv4/current/msg10668.html>


> 
> s10.2.1, para 26 (half way down p141):
>> Whereas, for locks and share reservations, freeing of
>>   locks will occur immediately upon the appearance of a conflicting
>>   request, for delegations, the server may institute period during
>>   which conflicting requests are held off.
> s/server may institute period/server MAY institute a period/

ok

> 
> s10.3.1, 1st bullet: s/The implementer is cautioned in this approach./The implementer is cautioned against this approach./

ok

> 
> s10.4.3, next to last para: s/break down/breaks down/

ok

> 
> s10.7, para 2: s/access remotely/accessed remotely/

ok

> 
> s11: For the avoidance of confusion, it would be wise to note that REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED are referring to the RFC 2119 usage rather than the description of attributes in this section.

As per Barry Leiba’s DISCUSS, we have removed this section.


> 
> s11, item 2; s15.4, next to last para: The implication of the illegal operation test in s15.4 is that there should be no gaps in the allocated operation number sequence.  The operation numbers for minor version X must start immediately after those for version (X-1) and be in a continuous group.

Ditto

> 
> s11, item 11; s15.4: If for some arcane reason a server supports minor version X (X >= 2) but does not support minor version Y (0 < Y < X) as allowed by the SHOULD in s11, should the server return NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP or an XDR decode error.  I would say that the SHOULD could lead to some considerable confusion for clients without a way to find out what versions a server implements.

Ditto

> 
> s11, item 12: Some clarification of the term 'infrastructural' is needed.
> 

Ditto

> s12.4: Has the dreaded BOM ever been encountered in the UTF-8 strings created by NFSv5 servers or clients?
>   Therefore, the mask returned enumerating which access rights can be
>   determined will have the ACCESS4_DELETE value set to 0.

David?

> 
> s12.4, 1st bullet: s/non-UT8-name/non-UTF-8 encoded name/


OK

> 
> s12.5, last para:@ s/without modifying name/without modifying the name/ or maybe "the names”.

ok, “the names"

> 
> s12.6: The reference to RFC 5890 needs to be one para earlier to go with the first occurrence of U-label and should be added for A-label.

ok

> 
> s13.1.10.1: s/client id/clientid/

ok

> 
> s15.2.5:
>>   The client SHOULD NOT construct a COMPOUND which mixes operations for
>>   different client IDs.
> Is this advisory on the grounds that it makes recovery difficult - in which case s/SHOULD NOT/should not/ - or something that might result in the server throwing an error - in which case please point to some discussion of why this is not legal. Later... this is also considered in s15.18.6, last para.  So there is one set of circumstances when it will screw up - but there are others where it is not problematical.  Perhaps this can be explained more clearly.
> 
> 
> 


Are these not the same?

Further, the client SHOULD
   NOT construct a COMPOUND which mixes operations for different client
   IDs.


David, are there migration scenarios where the client might be presenting different client IDs?

> 
> s15.3.5:
>>   Therefore, the mask returned enumerating which access rights can be
>>   determined will have the ACCESS4_DELETE value set to 0.
> s/determined/supported/

ok

> 
> s15.11:  Should this section talk about maxlink and the return of
> NFS4ERR_MLINK?

It could, is it necessary? No.


> 
> s15.16.4: LOOKUPP is said to return the parent directory of a named attribute directory. Arguably a named attribute directory doesn't have a parent... so does LOOKUPP return the directory in which the object to 'owning'  the named attribute directory resides?  Or does it return the owning object?  Please clarify in the text.


Good question.

From reading the text, it should return the parent of the directory in which the object to 'owning'  the named attribute directory resides. 

I’ve asked on list.

Ahh, 5661 to the rescue:

   If the current filehandle is a named attribute directory that is
   associated with a file system object via OPENATTR (i.e., not a sub-
   directory of a named attribute directory), LOOKUPP SHOULD return the
   filehandle of the associated file system object.

I have taken that paragraph back into 3530bis,

> 
> s15.18.2/s15.18.6/s15.21.2/s15.21.4, share_access and share_deny arguments: Presumably the shorthand DENY/READ/WRITE/BOTH values referred to are the relevant constants defined in s9.9?  If so please add a reference (and maybe use the full names in s15).  Otherwise please define the values.

Full names it is - btw - I agree, easier to read, but harder to map back to the real values.
And I did provide a link in the “one” which used the terms heavily.



> 
> s15.18.6, para 9:
>> If the component provided to OPEN resolves to something other than a
>>   regular file
> Worth pointing out this includes named attribute files.


Do you mean:

   If the component provided to OPEN resolves to something other than a
   regular file (or a named attribute)




> 
> s15.23.4:
> OLD:
>   The public filehandle represents the concepts embodied in [RFC2054],
>   [RFC2055], [RFC2224].  The intent for NFSv4 is that the public
>   filehandle (represented by the PUTPUBFH operation) be used as a
>   method of providing WebNFS server compatibility with NFSv2 and NFSv3.
> NEW:
>   The public filehandle concept was introduced with WebNFS described
>   in [RFC2054], [RFC2055], and [RFC2224].  The intent for NFSv4 is
>   that the public filehandle (provided by the PUTPUBFH operation) be
>   used as a method of providing compatibility with the WebNFS server
>   extension of NFSv2 and NFSv3.

ok


> 
> s15.23.5, last para: s/public filehandle a method/public filehandle as a method/

ok

> 
> s15.26.4/s15.26.5: What happens if the directory has been modified (entries added or deleted) between calls of READDIR intended to retrieve segments of the directory information?  Related to this, presumably no ordering of entries is implied in the returned information - it would be desirable to state this.


This is where the cookieverf is supposed to come in.

In most implementations, the cookie needs to be persistent, which indeed means an ordering of the information. 


> 
> s15.29.4:
>>   If the oldname refers to a named attribute and the saved and current
>>   filehandles refer to different file system objects, the server will
>>   return NFS4ERR_XDEV just as if the saved and current filehandles
>>   represented directories on different file systems.
> Presumably "filehandles refer to different file system objects" means the filehandles refer to the named attribute directories of different file system objects.  If so then add "the named attribute directories of”.

I think you are correct here.

So, ok.


> 

> s15.30.5, 1st bullet: s/client id/client ID/

ok

> 
> s15.35.5, 1st bullet: s/client id/client ID/

ok

> 
> s17, para 6: s/the client migrate its traffic/the client to migrate its traffic/

ok


> 
> s17, para 7: s/is checked against and match/is checked against and matches with/

ok


> 
> s17, para 8: s/see 5.9 and 12/see Sections 5.9 and 12/

I’ll have to track down what is happening here, might be with the newer xml2rfc:

    string comparison - see Sections
    <xref target="sec:fattr:owner_group" format="counter" /> and
    <xref target="sec:i18n" format="counter" /> for further

Hmm, this is generating correctly in draft 34.

I’ll make sure to track this with every new draft version.



> 
> s18.1, para 4: I don't believe you can have both policies of FCFS and Specification Required at the same time, and then with Expert Review for updates.  The proposal sounds like FCFS with a requirement that a description of format and intended usage is provided.

Already fixed in version 34.

Amazing how it got through 3 different prior reviews (3530, 5661, and first 3530bis). :-)

> 
> s19.2/s5.6: I guess it was intended...  s/ISEG_errata/IESG_ERRATA/

Ok, first part is fixed, will also change case.

> 
> s19: RFC 2279 (UTF-8) is referenced as normative with RFC 3629 which obsoletes RFC 2279 as informative.  I think that references to RFC 2279 should be replaced by RFC 3629 and this one made normative.

OK


> 
> s19.2: Arguably RFC 5226 (IANA considerations) is normative.

Ok