[Geopriv] Protocol Action: 'Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and Diameter' to Proposed Standard

[The IESG <[e-mail]>]

The IESG has approved the following document:

- 'Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and Diameter '
   <draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-24.txt> as a Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the Geographic Location/Privacy Working 
Group. 

The IESG contact persons are Cullen Jennings and Robert Sparks.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-24.txt

Technical Summary

 This document specifies RADIUS attributes for conveying access
 network location information, in both civic and geospatial location
 formats, along with access network ownership.  The distribution of
 location information is a privacy sensitive task.  Dealing with
 mechanisms to preserve the user's privacy is important and is
 addressed throughout, for various scenarios of location information
 function within AAA.

WG Summary

 The WG reached solid consensus to advance this document after
 a number of iterations.  The WG had initial hesitation about
 taking on the work, because the RFC 4119 pidf_lo object could
 not be used within RADIUS attribute size constraints.  The 
 WG concerns were met with an eventual functional compromise,
 providing a mandated attribute with the pidf_lo policy markers,
 and opaque attributes pointing to the geopriv location
 formats developed for DHCP which had constraints similar
 to RADIUS.   

 This document is a Critical Requirement for 3GPP.  Both the
 GSM Association and the ITU have specified Operator Namespace
 Tokens for use in this protocol.  (The document has customers).

Document Quality

 The protocol was reviewed in depth by both the GEOPRIV and
 RADEXT Working Groups.  RADEXT's formal issues list was 
 cleared.  GEOPRIV and RADEXT had some overlapping 
 issues, especially location information design,
 and scenario evaluation.  The conclusion that location-
 aware AAA systems need to be able to implement the
 formats and processing found in the GEOPRIV documents
 was very useful, because it meant that GEOPRIV did not
 have to intercept or anticipate any enhancements of the
 RADIUS data model. 

 The document is especially careful in projecting GEOPRIV's
 paranoia towards exposing location information.  Section
 8.3 contains a detailed review against the previously
 defined requirements related to this, and the Security
 Considerations details the use of security services
 RADIUS provides as the using protocol to meet requirements.