Re: [Geopriv] [geopriv] #23: Good Security of DHCP

["geopriv issue tracker" <[e-mail]>]

#23: Good Security of DHCP
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 Reporter:  Hannes.Tschofenig@…        |        Owner:  Hannes.Tschofenig@…       
     Type:  enhancement                |       Status:  closed                    
 Priority:  major                      |    Milestone:  draft-ietf-geopriv-3825bis
Component:  rfc3825bis                 |      Version:                            
 Severity:  Active WG Document         |   Resolution:  fixed                     
 Keywords:                             |  
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Changes (by bernard_aboba@…):

  * status:  new => closed
  * resolution:  => fixed
  * severity:  - => Active WG Document


Comment:

 The current text of the security considerations section addresses
 potential disclosure risks as well as modification attacks.  I will add
 some advice on use of link level encryption in -06.

 "Where critical decisions might be based on the value of this GeoConf
 option, DHCP authentication as defined in "Authentication for DHCP
 Messages" [RFC3118] and "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
 (DHCPv6)" [RFC3315] SHOULD be used to protect the integrity of the DHCP
 options.

 Since there is no privacy protection for DHCP messages, an
 eavesdropper who can monitor the link between the DHCP server and
 requesting client can discover this LCI.

 To minimize the unintended exposure of location information, the LCI
 option SHOULD be returned by DHCP servers only when the DHCP client
 has included this option in its 'parameter request list' (section 3.5
 [RFC2131]).

 When implementing a DHCP server that will serve clients across an
 uncontrolled network, one should consider the potential security
 risks."

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Ticket URL: <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/wg/geopriv/trac/ticket/23#comment:3>
geopriv <http://tools.ietf.org/geopriv/>