[GROW] Re: [Sidrops] Re: One week review for Security Section of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4360-bis-07 (06-04-2026 - 06-11-2026)

Job Snijders <job@bsd.nl> Fri, 05 June 2026 07:18 UTC

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Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2026 07:18:49 +0000
From: Job Snijders <job@bsd.nl>
To: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
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Subject: [GROW] Re: [Sidrops] Re: One week review for Security Section of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4360-bis-07 (06-04-2026 - 06-11-2026)
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On Fri, Jun 05, 2026 at 05:42:02AM +0000, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
> Thank you for sharing. Adding GROW as well as some relevant discussion
> already is happening there as well (not to mention guidance in
> draft-ietf-grow-ixp-ext-comms).

thanks

> Please review and send your comments to the mailing list by June 11 2026.
> 
> Suggested Text from authors:
> 
> 9.  Security Considerations
>    The BGP Extended Communities provide a general mechanism for labeling
>    BGP routes and thus share security considerations similar to BGP
>    Communities [RFC1997] and BGP Large Communities [RFC8092].
> 
>    Additionally, extended communities are used in several specialized
>    ways to implement or augment other BGP signaling mechanisms.  For
>    example, the route-target extended community, defined in this
>    document, is used to signal Layer 3 VPN membership.

Perhaps add something to acknowledge that as extended communities can be
used in the construction of private networks, the potential exposure of
extended communities into public networks poses a security risk. A few
paragraphs down there is text that starts with "to prevent infoleak /
privacy breach", but that doesn't explicitly tie the risk to the origin
of the risk: extcomms are used as described in the paragraph above.

>    Since any intermediate AS in the path may have added, deleted, or
>    altered the BGP Extended Communities attribute, an AS relying on such
>    an attribute carried in the BGP Update message must have trust in
>    every other AS in the path.  Specifying the mechanism to provide such
>    trust is beyond the scope of this document.
> 
>    The BGP Extended Communities attribute itself does not protect the
>    integrity of each extended community value.  The operator should be
>    aware that any BGP speaker along the path can alter the attribute
>    without notice.  Protecting the integrity of the handling of BGP
>    Extended Communities attribute in a manner consistent with the intent
>    of expressed BGP routing policies falls within the broader scope of
>    securing BGP and is therefore not addressed here.
> 
>    To prevent information leakage or privacy breach across different
>    administrative domains, proper filtering of the extended communities
>    should always be exercised:
> 
>    *  Operators should filter transitive and non-transitive extended
>       communities at the boundary of different administrative domains on
>       both transmission and reception using appropriate routing
>       policies, since this prevents extended communities outside the
>       administrative domain from interacting inappropriately with the
>       operator's network.
> 
>    *  Implementations should provide policy mechanisms to filter
>       extended communities based on type, and possibly sub-type, to
>       permit filtering the entire class of extended communities.
>       Implementations may also provide the flexibility to match or
>       inverse-match a set of extended communities for building permit/
>       deny lists.
> 
>    *  Implementations that understand the internal format of a defined
>       extended community should provide per-community match capability.
>       Implementations that don't understand the internal format may
>       match against the value field opaquely.
> 
>    *  Implementations should provide mechanisms to strip all extended
>       communities at the boundary of administrative domains.
>       Implementations may strip all extended communities by default
>       while providing knobs to modify the default behavior.


I had to read all the way down to this buried in the last paragraph
seond second sentence... to find this super useful reco to strip all
extended communities by default! 

I would recommend to make the last sentence its own bullet point. I.e.:


>    *  Implementations should provide mechanisms to strip all extended
>       communities at the boundary of administrative domains.
>
>    *  Implementations may strip all extended communities by default
>       while providing knobs to modify the default behavior.


Kind regards,

Job