Re: [GROW] last call for draft-ietf-grow-unique-origin-as-00

marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es> Tue, 21 December 2010 20:39 UTC

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Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2010 21:41:15 +0100
From: marcelo bagnulo braun <marcelo@it.uc3m.es>
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Subject: Re: [GROW] last call for draft-ietf-grow-unique-origin-as-00
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El 21/12/10 21:22, Roland Dobbins escribió:
> On Dec 22, 2010, at 3:17 AM, marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
>
>> making the parts of the network taking the rogue announce for valid likely to be higher, than in the case of the anycast, where there are several legitimate origins.
> No, because *upon investigation*, it's generally considerably easier to determine which announcements are legitimate and which aren't for a given prefix which isn't anycasted vs. doing so for one which is anycasted.

Right, so basically you are saying is that if there is a unicast 
announcement that should come from a single origin, it is easier to 
distinguish the rogue announcements than in the case of an anycast 
announcement, where it can come from multiple origins?

If that is the case, i can see that.
Now that doesn't imply afaict that the surface of the attack will be 
bigger, just that it is harder to identify.
Second, it is not obvious to me why having different origins for each 
anycast location makes this situation any easier in the case of a 
malicious attacker (Who is could potentially include a false origin in 
its announcement)

Regards, marcelo

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