HIP and IKE -- was -- Re: [Hipsec] Moving the base spec forward
thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com (Henderson, Thomas R) Mon, 13 September 2004 18:42 UTC
From: thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 18:42:01 +0000
Subject: HIP and IKE -- was -- Re: [Hipsec] Moving the base spec forward
Message-ID: <6938661A6EDA8A4EA8D1419BCE46F24C04060832@xch-nw-27.nw.nos.boeing.com>
X-Date: Mon Sep 13 18:42:01 2004
Yogesh, thanks for your discussions, I have a few responses inline: >=20 > > One bigger issue is relationship to middlex boxes, though. HIP > > has been designed to be middle box friendly, explicitly keeping > > fields that middle boxes might inspect, including SPIs, in clear > > text. IKE favours confidentiality and secrecy here, HIP doesn't. > >=20 >=20 > My preferred approach for middle boxes (some prefer evil-boxes) is to > let the protocol break in its presence. Clearly, I'm in a=20 > minority here! :-) There was a recent position paper in Sigcomm conference that argues that middleboxes can be your friend :) >=20 > But I see your point. Although, I won't keep the SPI in clear, I can > still live with it. Without SPI encryption, USER_ID encryption alone > looses a few of its of benefits. One application of HIP that my company is quite interested in is the ability to do access controls on a HIP-enabled data connection, for which the middleboxes need to know the mapping from HITs to SPIs that are generated by the HIP exchange. I have been told many times that large corporations are not going to throw away their middleboxes once IPv6 comes around. >=20 >=20 > >> The draft needs to motivate the need for a new key exchange > >> protocol. > >=20 > >=20 > > Actually, that is the task of the architecture draft. If=20 > it doesn't, > > or does the job poorly, please indicate which parts of the=20 > architecture > > draft you would like to see improved. (-06 is malformated, I'm > > in the process of issuing -07. -05 may be easier to read, if you > > can find it.) >=20 >=20 > Well, I didn't find any discussion in=20 > draft-moskowitz-hip-arch-06.txt on > why someone will choose a "low policy granularity" based key-exchange > (i.e., present HIP) when another one already exists. >=20 > Also, I am not clear why HIP has lower policy granularity.=20 > Isn't policy > based on the USER_ID (e-mail. FQDN etc.) -- which HIP already has? Do > you mean fancy ways of authenticating hosts, by policy granularity? I > must be missing something here. >=20 I have always understood this phrasing to mean that HIP exchange does not offer as many negotiation options for the SA attributes, and does not enable things like setting up multiple SAs between hosts that match on various different header values in the data packets. > Not saying we should not have HIP key exchange. But do add=20 > some text on > why? IESG might as well ask the same question. >=20 I agree with you that the architecture draft does not really talk about why HIP is different from IKE. It seems to be nowhere written down.
- HIP and IKE -- was -- Re: [Hipsec] Moving the bas… Henderson, Thomas R
- HIP and IKE -- was -- Re: [Hipsec] Moving the bas… Robert Moskowitz
- HIP and IKE -- was -- Re: [Hipsec] Moving the bas… Ahrenholz, Jeffrey M
- [Hipsec] NONCE parameter in base exchange? Petri Jokela
- [Hipsec] NONCE parameter in base exchange? Julien Laganier
- [Hipsec] NONCE parameter in base exchange? Jan Mikael Melen
- Multiple parallel SAs (was Re: [Hipsec] NONCE par… Pekka Nikander
- Multiple parallel SAs (was Re: [Hipsec] NONCE par… Tim Shepard
- Multiple parallel SAs (was Re: [Hipsec] NONCE par… Yogesh Prem Swami
- Multiple parallel SAs (was Re: [Hipsec] NONCE par… Pekka Nikander
- Multiple parallel SAs (was Re: [Hipsec] NONCE par… Yogesh Prem Swami