Re: [Hipsec] Comment on VIA_RVS parameter - 5204 & 06 -bis

Miika Komu <miika.komu@ericsson.com> Mon, 26 September 2016 13:08 UTC

Return-Path: <miika.komu@ericsson.com>
X-Original-To: hipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: hipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8378B12B1C7 for <hipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 26 Sep 2016 06:08:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.201
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id AC2QpLmdE0CY for <hipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 26 Sep 2016 06:08:25 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sesbmg23.ericsson.net (sesbmg23.ericsson.net [193.180.251.37]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8587012B1B8 for <hipsec@ietf.org>; Mon, 26 Sep 2016 06:08:25 -0700 (PDT)
X-AuditID: c1b4fb25-5405a9800000793b-f2-57e91dc75a75
Received: from ESESSHC021.ericsson.se (Unknown_Domain [153.88.183.81]) by (Symantec Mail Security) with SMTP id 1F.F8.31035.7CD19E75; Mon, 26 Sep 2016 15:08:23 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from [131.160.51.22] (153.88.183.153) by smtp.internal.ericsson.com (153.88.183.83) with Microsoft SMTP Server id 14.3.301.0; Mon, 26 Sep 2016 15:08:19 +0200
To: <hipsec@ietf.org>
References: <alpine.LRH.2.01.1609152257460.24569@hymn02.u.washington.edu> <fb5704fd-f099-92d8-025b-4f3cee0acb4f@htt-consult.com>
From: Miika Komu <miika.komu@ericsson.com>
Organization: Ericsson AB
Message-ID: <9dceaf66-40e7-08d4-86b7-b6228d25f6bb@ericsson.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 16:08:19 +0300
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.3.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <fb5704fd-f099-92d8-025b-4f3cee0acb4f@htt-consult.com>
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha-256; boundary="------------ms010207070004010503030607"
X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFnrOLMWRmVeSWpSXmKPExsUyM2J7oO5x2ZfhBnfWW1pMXTSZ2YHRY8mS n0wBjFFcNimpOZllqUX6dglcGYfevmMvWGJXsXTSTJYGxsOWXYycHBICJhIXpz9k6WLk4hAS WM8ocfnQRzYIZzWjxP9Z+9m7GDk4hAWcJTYdFARpEBEQlZjy4TQzRE0To0T/4g4WkASbgJbE qjvXmUFsfgFJiQ0Nu5lBenkF7CXuv2ADCbMIqErc/LiUEcQWFYiQuPUQopVXQFDi5MwnYDYn 0KqmX+fBbmAW6GaUODlpKQvIHCEBFYmLx4InMPLPQtIyC1kZSIJZwFbiztzdzBC2tsSyha+h bGuJGb8OskHYihJTuh+yQ9imEq+PfmSEsI0llq37y7aAkWMVo2hxanFSbrqRsV5qUWZycXF+ nl5easkmRmCQH9zyW3UH4+U3jocYBTgYlXh4E248DxdiTSwrrsw9xKgCNOfRhtUXGKVY8vLz UpVEeDeJvQwX4k1JrKxKLcqPLyrNSS0+xCjNwaIkzmu28n64kEB6YklqdmpqQWoRTJaJg1Oq gVHBR3DZGaOZr4qvXDm1lc9cztBd0MlJOmJy46zOn+1yRbNFfxudWTylMTomtETjT/v1a6Xi F8S3JIneey69SeHV91CWzG7L2fczX076kLbJ8Lb8yqAlS/xmSx/6FVIicIbViTNB2KvMTHOZ 8XztD5dYpnZ9zwj7nj/14twPzDks/5S+1O5oma7EUpyRaKjFXFScCADvdJYyegIAAA==
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/hipsec/m50lCUjLEgqwttv-BPADbRYreOA>
Subject: Re: [Hipsec] Comment on VIA_RVS parameter - 5204 & 06 -bis
X-BeenThere: hipsec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the official IETF Mailing List for the HIP Working Group." <hipsec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/hipsec>, <mailto:hipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/hipsec/>
List-Post: <mailto:hipsec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:hipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec>, <mailto:hipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 13:08:30 -0000

Hi,

On 09/16/2016 02:45 PM, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
>
>
> On 09/16/2016 06:57 AM, Tom Henderson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, 15 Sep 2016, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
>>
>>> 5206-bis specifies how to user RVS for the 'double-jump' mobility
>>> problem.
>>>
>>> 3.2.3 1) says:
>>>
>>> 1. The mobile host sending an UPDATE to the peer, and not receiving
>>> an ACK, MAY resend the UPDATE to a rendezvous server (RVS) of the
>>> peer, if such a server is known.
>>>
>>> But it DOES know there is an RVS IF the I1 had FROM and RVS_HMAC
>>> parameters and it had created a VIA_RVS parameter to send in the R1.
>>
>> Yes, but the responder may not know the initiator's RVS even if the
>> the responder's RVS was used, and it also may be the case that neither
>> host's RVS was involved in the session setup.
>
> I see now.  As currently speced, R has no way of learning I's RVS. The
> 'easy' way to fix this is for I to include a VIA_RVS in the I2 packet
> for mobility support.
>
> "If you every want to get back to me, I can always be reached at this
> number".

do you actually need the initiator's RVS for double jump? I think the 
responder's RVS is enough.

>>> This VIA_RVS provides the knowledge and locator of the peer's RVS.
>>>
>>> In fact an aggressive mobility UPDATE would be sent simultaneously to
>>> the host and its RVS.  If the host had not moved itself, it gets both
>>> and drops the one from the RVS.
>>
>> I believe that Baris Boyvat on the InfraHIP project was looking a
>> while back at such an approach to fast mobility; it was called
>> 'shotgun' approach to mobility and multihoming (try all candidates
>> simultaneously), if I remember correctly.

Yes, the idea was to send I1 (or UPDATE) through all the available 
address pairs, but I think the idea is now achieved in a more controlled 
way in draft-ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal-13