Re: [HOKEY] Key Management Issues

Since "ERX fraud issue" raised by Bernard still remains unresolved (at
least I am not convinced at all), I have a reservation on removing
KDE1 and KDE4 from KDE exchange.  KDE1 and KDE4 provide peer consent
for DSRK key distribution, which addresses ERX fraud issue.

Yoshihiro Ohba

On Mon, Mar 17, 2008 at 08:03:21PM -0400, Charles Clancy wrote:
> All,
> 
> During IETF 71, there was relatively strong room consensus for the 
> following changes to the key management document:
> 
> - Remove ALL encryption from existing key-mgm document; elimination
>    of KDE0, KDE1, and KDE 4
> - Lay out security requirements for hop-by-hop security, apply to
>    all transports
> - Define RADIUS attribute for key request and transport to meet
>    HOKEY needs
> 
> First, for anyone who did not register an opinion during the meeting, 
> here's your chance.
> 
> Secondly, we need to figure out how to evolve the document to meet these 
> requirements.  I suggest the authors of draft-ietf-hokey-key-mgm-03 and 
> draft-gaonkar-radext-erp-attrs-03 work together to merge their two 
> documents, and create draft-ietf-hokey-key-mgm-04.  Parts of 
> draft-gaonkar-radext-erp-attrs-03 that are specific to ERX should remain 
> in place (i.e. text updating RFC 3579) for a v04 of that document.
> 
> I've created the following issues to track these changes:
> 
> KM: AAA security
> http://www.ltsnet.net:8080/hokey/issue40
> 
> KM: AAA transport
> http://www.ltsnet.net:8080/hokey/issue41
> 
> KM: transport security requirements
> http://www.ltsnet.net:8080/hokey/issue42
> 
> -- 
> t. charles clancy, ph.d.                 eng.umd.edu/~tcc
> electrical & computer engineering, university of maryland
> _______________________________________________
> HOKEY mailing list
> HOKEY@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hokey
> 
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