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Re: FW: New Version Notification for draft-thomson-http2-client-certs-01.txt

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Wed, 27 January 2016 17:46 UTC

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Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 04:41:34 +1100
Message-ID: <CABkgnnU1qubvnAzfQS+pbzVi7nVANK+sgyKbGEpV2t83X8TZMw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
Cc: Mike Bishop <Michael.Bishop@microsoft.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
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Subject: Re: FW: New Version Notification for draft-thomson-http2-client-certs-01.txt
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On 27 January 2016 at 19:47, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> Basically, I favor dropping insecure or excessively weak algorithms
> from new specifications or versions, even at severe cost to deploy-
> ability. We have gotten burned *far* too many times from not doing that,
> and *will* get burned in future if we continue allowing those.


I'm always happy to use support for a new feature as a signal that
it's safe to ratchet the security knob one step further.  Let's just
make sure that we have good justification.  EMS and reduced signature
algorithms is a fine suggestion here because they have a material
impact on the properties we are looking to gain.

If you want to suggest anything else, I'm open to it, but I think we
need at least a little justification.

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