Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion
Mike Belshe <mike@belshe.com> Fri, 18 September 2015 18:23 UTC
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Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2015 11:20:05 -0700
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From: Mike Belshe <mike@belshe.com>
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Cc: Henry Story <henry.story@co-operating.systems>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
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Subject: Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion
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In a strange twist of fate I find myself doing a lot of PKI work these days, and I've considered a fair bit about how client-certs might help with some of my application-level needs. However, just like HTTP's basic-auth, I wonder HTTP or TLS level client-certs will just never be used? My concern, of course, is that we build something that has a user experience similar to HTTP's basic-auth. It's so bad that nobody can use it and authentication gets pulled into web pages (where ironically, it is less secure!). Mark - you said there is "pain". Is there a set of use cases to be solved here? Let me know if I missed them - I may be able to contribute. My suspicion is that we really need crypto features moved up a level from the protocol, as it will be very difficult to make satisfactory user interfaces from the protocol level alone. Perhaps for machine-to-machine auth it would be okay. Mike On Fri, Sep 18, 2015 at 10:05 AM, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote: > Hi Henry, > > Thanks, but this is a much more narrowly-scoped discussion -- how to make > client certs as they currently operate work in HTTP/2. At most, I think > we'd be talking about incrementally improving client certs (e.g., > clarifying / optimising the scope of their applicability -- and that really > just is an example, not a statement of intent). > > Cheers, > > > > On 18 Sep 2015, at 11:53 am, Henry Story > <henry.story@co-operating.systems> wrote: > > > > > >> On 17 Sep 2015, at 23:10, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote: > >> > >> Hi, > >> > >> We've talked about client certificates in HTTP/2 (and elsewhere) for a > while, but the discussion has stalled. > >> > >> I've heard from numerous places that this is causing Pain. So, I'd like > to devote a chunk of our time in Yokohama to discussing this. > >> > >> If you have a proposal or thoughts that might become a proposal in this > area, please brush it off and be prepared. Of course, we can discuss > on-list in the meantime. > >> > >> Cheers, > >> > >> -- > >> Mark Nottingham https://www.mnot.net/ > > > > > > Apart from the proposals as the proposal by Martin Thomson > > and the follow up work referenced earlier in this thread > > by Mike Bishop [1], I'd like to mention more HTTP centric > > prototypes which would rely perhaps not so much on certificates, > > but on linked public keys, that build on existing HTTP > > mechanisms such as WWW-Authenticate, which if they pass security > > scrutiny would fit nicely it seems to me with HTTP/2.0 . > > > > • Andrei Sambra's first sketch authentication protocol > > https://github.com/solid/solid-spec#webid-rsa > > > > • Manu Sporny's more fully fleshed out HTTP Message signature > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cavage-http-signatures-04 > > > > These and the more TLS centric protocols require the user > > agent to be able to use public/private keys generated by > > the agent, and signed or published by that origin, to > > authenticate or sign documents across origins. > > > > This is where one often runs into the Same Origin Policy (SOP) > > stone wall. There was an important discussion on > > public-webappsec@w3.org [1] and public-web-security@w3.org > > entitled > > > > "A Somewhat Critical View of SOP (Same Origin Policy)" [2] > > > > that I think has helped clarify the distinction between Same Origin > > Policy, Linkability, Privacy and User Control, and which I hope > > has helped show that this policy cannot be applied without > > care nor can it apply everywhere. > > > > The arguments developed there should be helpful in opening discussion > > here and elswhere too I think. In a couple of e-mails in that > > thread, I went into great detail showing how SOP, linkability and User > > Control and privacy apply in very different ways to 4 technologies: > > Cookies, FIDO, JS Crypto API and client certificates [3]. This shows > > that the concepts don't overlap, two being technical and the two > > legal/philosophical, each technology enabling some aspect of the > > other, and not always the way one would expect. > > > > Having made those conceptual distinctions I think the path to > > acceptance of solutions proposed by this group will be much eased. > > > > Looking forward to following and testing work developed here, > > > > All the best, > > > > Henry > > > > > > [1] • starting: > https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/2015AprJun/0558.html > > • most recent by Mike Bishop > > > https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/2015JulSep/0310.html > > [2] https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2015Sep/ > > [3] > https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2015Sep/0101.html > > which is in part summarised with respect to FIDO in a much shorter > > email > > > https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2015Sep/0119.html > > > > -- > Mark Nottingham https://www.mnot.net/ > > > > > >
- Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mark Nottingham
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Martin Thomson
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion henry.story@bblfish.net
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mark Nottingham
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion henry.story@bblfish.net
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mike Belshe
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mark Nottingham
- RE: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mike Bishop
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Eric Rescorla
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Stefan Eissing
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Eric Rescorla
- RE: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mike Bishop
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Yoav Nir
- RE: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mike Bishop
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Yoav Nir
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion henry.story@bblfish.net
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Kyle Rose
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Yoav Nir
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Stefan Eissing
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Kyle Rose
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mike Belshe
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion henry.story@bblfish.net
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Stephen Farrell
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Kyle Rose
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Jason Greene
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion henry.story@bblfish.net
- RE: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mike Bishop
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Stefan Eissing
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion henry.story@bblfish.net
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Alex Rousskov
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mark Nottingham
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Stefan Eissing
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Martin Thomson
- RE: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Mike Bishop
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Yoav Nir
- Re: Client Certificates - re-opening discussion Ryan Hamilton