Re: Web Keys and HTTP Signatures

Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org> Thu, 18 April 2013 05:56 UTC

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From: Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>
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Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2013 07:54:11 +0200
Cc: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>, Web Payments CG <public-webpayments@w3.org>, ietf-http-wg@w3.org
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To: "David I. Lehn" <dil@lehn.org>
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Subject: Re: Web Keys and HTTP Signatures
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On Apr 18, 2013, at 02:22, "David I. Lehn" <dil@lehn.org> wrote:

> if you find security issues

Wrong question.

A security spec is worthless if it doesn't establish useful security properties.

The spec needs a good look from people with more security mojo.
(Or maybe it can simply be replaced by one of the more learned attempts under discussion, see
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/minutes/minutes-85-httpauth
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/86/minutes/minutes-86-httpauth
for some links.)

*Then* you can look at whether you have implemented it correctly.

Grüße, Carsten