same-site |Re: Formalizing the HTTP State Tokens proposal.
Kari Hurtta <hurtta-ietf@elmme-mailer.org> Sun, 07 April 2019 17:13 UTC
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To: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
Date: Sun, 07 Apr 2019 20:10:00 +0300
From: Kari Hurtta <hurtta-ietf@elmme-mailer.org>
CC: Kari Hurtta <hurtta-ietf@elmme-mailer.org>
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Subject: same-site |Re: Formalizing the HTTP State Tokens proposal.
Archived-At: <https://www.w3.org/mid/20190407171006.AD9EEB38@welho-filter3.welho.com>
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Follow-up: Delivery scope "same-site" should be same definition on "same-siteness" than 5.2. "Same-site" and "cross-site" Requests https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-02#section-5.2 gives. But now it is not. It is confusing when two releted technology uses different definition. ( SameSite is already implemented by browsers ) ( continuing inline ) > 3.2. Requests and Responses > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-west-http-state-tokens-00#section-3.2 > > | This document relies upon the definitions of "request" and "response" > | found in [Fetch]. > | > | A request's delivery scope can be obtained as follows: > | > | 1. Let "request-origin" be the request's "origin", and "target- > | origin" be the request's "URL"'s "origin". > | > | 2. If the request was generated by the user agent as a response to > | direct user interaction with the user agent (e.g. the user typed > | an address into the agent's address bar, clicked a bookmark, or > | etc.), return "same-origin". > | > | 3. If "request-origin" is same-origin with "target-origin", return > | "same-origin". > | > | 4. If "request-origin"'s registrable domain is the same as "target- > | origin"'s registrable domain, return "same-site". I think that should be named "same-domain" so that it does not confuse "same-site" request definition for SameSite cookies (it uses "site for cookies"). Use "same-site" term for request's delivery scope only if client's "site for cookies" (as defined for SameSite) is the same as "target-origin"'s registrable domain. > | 5. Return "cross-site". > > > Is delivery=same-site intended to cause Sec-Http-State request field > to be send about same requests than Cookies with SameSite attribute? > > SameSite seems use definition "site for cookies" for that. How that > compare to "request-origin" ? "site for cookies" is different than "request-origin" That is effectively https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/origin.html#origin | If the Document's URL's scheme is a network scheme | | A copy of the Document's URL's origin assigned when the Document is created. | | The document.open() method can change the Document's URL to "about:blank". Therefore the origin is assigned when the Document is created. > 5.2. "Same-site" and "cross-site" Requests > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-02#section-5.2 > > | 2. Let "site" be "request"'s client's "site for cookies" (as defined > | in the following sections). > | > | 3. Let "target" be the registered domain of "request"'s current url. > | > | 4. If "site" is an exact match for "target", return "same-site". > > 5.2.1. Document-based requests > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-02#section-5.2.1 > > | For a document displayed in a top-level browsing context, we can stop > | here: the document's "site for cookies" is the top-level site. > > (and so on) https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-02#section-5.2.1 specially: | 5.2.1. Document-based requests | | The URI displayed in a user agent's address bar is the only security | context directly exposed to users, and therefore the only signal | users can reasonably rely upon to determine whether or not they trust | a particular website. The registered domain of that URI's origin | represents the context in which a user most likely believes | themselves to be interacting. We'll label this domain the "top-level | site". | | For a document displayed in a top-level browsing context, we can stop | here: the document's "site for cookies" is the top-level site. | | For documents which are displayed in nested browsing contexts, we | need to audit the origins of each of a document's ancestor browsing | contexts' active documents in order to account for the "multiple- | nested scenarios" described in Section 4 of [RFC7034]. These | document's "site for cookies" is the top-level site if and only if | the document and each of its ancestor documents' origins have the | same registered domain as the top-level site. Otherwise its "site | for cookies" is the empty string. > > I failed interpret how Fetch defines request's "origin" > > https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-request-origin > > https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/origin.html#concept-origin > > > Specially nested browsing contexts (iframes and so on). / Kari Hurtta
- Formalizing the HTTP State Tokens proposal. Mike West
- Re: Formalizing the HTTP State Tokens proposal. Kari Hurtta
- Re: Formalizing the HTTP State Tokens proposal. Kari Hurtta
- Re: Formalizing the HTTP State Tokens proposal. Ilari Liusvaara
- Server/Site opt-in | Re: Formalizing the HTTP Sta… Kari Hurtta
- same-site |Re: Formalizing the HTTP State Tokens … Kari Hurtta
- delivery=same-origin | Re: Formalizing the HTTP S… Kari Hurtta
- cross-site | Re: Formalizing the HTTP State Token… Kari Hurtta
- key, register | Re: Formalizing the HTTP State To… Kari Hurtta
- Server/Site opt-in #2 | Re: Formalizing the HTTP … Kari Hurtta
- Signature | Re: Formalizing the HTTP State Tokens… Kari Hurtta
- Signature #2: No CBOR | Re: Formalizing the HTTP … Kari Hurtta