Re: Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-16: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 17 June 2021 02:54 UTC

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Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 19:50:13 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics@ietf.org, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, Tommy Pauly <tpauly@apple.com>
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Subject: Re: Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-16: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hi Mark,

On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 11:44:58AM +1000, Mark Nottingham wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> > On 17 Jun 2021, at 6:39 am, Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
> > 
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > DISCUSS:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > 
> > Thank you for this quite masterfully done mammoth undertaking!  I expect
> > to ballot Yes pending discussion of one point.
> > 
> > I'm looking at the following text in Section 4.3.4 relating to how to
> > handle certificate validation failures for https:
> > 
> >   If the certificate is not valid for the URI's origin server, a user
> >   agent MUST either notify the user (user agents MAY give the user an
> >   option to continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the
> >   connection with a bad certificate error.  [...]
> > 
> > Given the discussion up in §3.5 about requirements to "notify" the user
> > vs requiring "confirmation" from the user, I don't think that just "MUST
> > notify the user" is sufficient to prevent the user-agent from
> > continuing, since it is sufficient to just write a log entry as the
> > means to notify the user.  Is the intent to require confirmation of the
> > action to continue in the face of such an error (which, again per §3.5
> > could be a pre-configured confirmation)?  An intent to require
> > "confirmation" (vs mere "notification") seems consistent with the
> > subsequent text placing requirements on automated clients and would be
> > more consistent with my understanding of general IETF consensus for
> > securing protocols
> 
> Good catch. I think that 'notify the user' --> 'obtain confirmation from the user' is the right change here (possibly with a reference to 3.5).
> 
> Anyone disagree?

Not I -- that sounds good to me.
The parenthetical might want a bit of reworking (or removal?) as a
follow-up, though.

Thanks,

Ben