Re: SNI Extension for Alt-Svc

[Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>]

One thought that has been bugging me.  This doesn't seem to do anything for
the bootstrapping scenario.  At least, not any more than the secondary
certs on its own does.  Was I missing something?

On Fri, Dec 1, 2017 at 11:26 AM, Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> Hi Mike,
>
> Interesting idea.
>
> How would you imagine this interacting with a client's TLS session cache?
> Specifying unique SNI values that contain encrypted information is
> interesting, but you want to ensure that the TLS session cache for the
> hostname is not used or you could get linkability based on the value of a
> session ID or session ticket.
>
> Also, I think that it would be good to have some sort of commitment to TLS
> 1.3 support.  Then you could rely on the server certificate being
> protected.  I don't want to have to rely on secondary certificates and the
> associated delays.  This seems like it could be a reasonable alternative to
> the secondary certificates work.
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 1, 2017 at 4:56 AM, Mike Bishop <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> I was already planning to spin up a thread on that draft today, so thanks
>> for deciding what I'm doing next today!  😉  Forking a separate thread.
>>
>>
>>
>> WG, https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bishop-httpbis-sni-altsvc-00
>> proposes a new parameter for Alt-Svc suggesting that a client use a
>> different (presumably generic) hostname in the TLS SNI extension, and
>> instead gain Alt-Svc "reasonable assurances" by requesting the origin's
>> certificate via Secondary Certificates (which is currently under Call for
>> Adoption).  It gives a solution, albeit HTTP-specific, to SNI privacy by
>> providing a discoverability path for which generic hostname can be used to
>> reach a more sensitive origin under encryption.
>>
>>
>>
>> As to the frame reference, I intentionally didn't reference which
>> protocol, in part because Alt-Svc itself says it can be carried by various
>> mechanisms and the definition of an Alt-Svc extension doesn't need to get
>> into that layer.  The Alt-Svc frame for HTTP/QUIC is specified by
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bishop-httpbis-altsvc-quic-00.  While
>> frames are present in both HTTP/2 and HTTP/QUIC, I don't think that makes
>> frames a generic HTTP concept -- it's a property of certain mappings, and
>> specified individually in each of them.
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Lucas Pardue [mailto:[e-mail]]
>> Sent: Thursday, November 30, 2017 2:13 AM
>> To: Mike Bishop <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
>> Cc: Mark Nottingham <[e-mail]>; HTTP Working Group <
>> [e-mail]>; Patrick McManus <[e-mail]>
>> Subject: RE: DRAFT: more details for HTTPtre
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Mike,
>>
>>
>>
>> The connection coalescing case is interesting as it's not currently
>> described in HTTP/QUIC. Presumably by oversight or time constraint rather
>> than intent. (We've got a ticket open tracking that one.)
>>
>>
>>
>> Changing track, I've just seen your SNI I-D
>>
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bishop-httpbis-sni-altsvc-00
>>
>>
>>
>> References to Frames don't state a specific mapping (HTTP/2 or
>> HTTP/QUIC). Reading between the lines this seems intentional, which got me
>> thinking that also Frames could be described as a new HTTP semantic for
>> binary-capable wire formats.
>>
>>
>>
>> Lucas
>>
>> ________________________________________
>>
>> From: Mike Bishop [[e-mail]]
>>
>> Sent: 28 November 2017 18:32
>>
>> To: Lucas Pardue; [e-mail]
>>
>> Cc: Mark Nottingham; HTTP Working Group; Patrick McManus
>>
>> Subject: RE: DRAFT: more details for HTTPtre
>>
>>
>>
>> I agree that HPACK is largely decouplable from HTTP/2, or HTTP.  The core
>> of the protocol is a general-purpose compression algorithm for streaming
>> key-value dictionaries, rather than straight text.  The pieces that bind it
>> to H2 are incidental, and perhaps we could have structured it differently.
>>
>>
>>
>> Coalescing isn't a new semantic -- each HTTP mapping defines how
>> parallelism and connection reuse should work in that mapping.  HTTP/2
>> simply happens to define it more expansively than HTTP/1.1.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
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