I-D Action: draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-00.txt
internet-drafts@ietf.org Fri, 28 September 2018 21:00 UTC
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. Title : The OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol Author : Hugo Krawczyk Filename : draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-00.txt Pages : 17 Date : 2018-09-28 Abstract: This draft describes the OPAQUE protocol, a secure asymmetric password authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) that supports mutual authentication in a client-server setting without any reliance on PKI. OPAQUE is the first PKI-free aPAKE to accommodate secret salt and therefore is the first to be secure against pre-computation attacks upon server compromise. In contrast, prior aPAKE protocols did not use salt and if they did, the salt was transmitted in the clear from server to user allowing for the building of targeted pre- computed dictionaries. OPAQUE security has been proven by Jarecki et al. (Eurocrypt 2018) in a strong and universally composable formal model of aPAKE security. In addition, the protocol provides forward secrecy and the ability to hide the password from the server even during password registration. Strong security, good performance and an array of additional features make OPAQUE a natural candidate for practical use and for adoption as a standard. To this end, this draft presents several optimized instantiations of OPAQUE and ways of integrating OPAQUE with TLS. The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque/ There are also htmlized versions available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-00 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-00 Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
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