I-D Action: draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-04.txt

internet-drafts@ietf.org Fri, 15 May 2020 02:39 UTC

Return-Path: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Delivered-To: i-d-announce@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 177E83A0645 for <i-d-announce@ietf.org>; Thu, 14 May 2020 19:39:23 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Subject: I-D Action: draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-04.txt
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.130.0
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Message-ID: <158951036303.16849.8096296798359704798@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 19:39:23 -0700
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i-d-announce/uMGTrRBFEESnbanDtJOPm7Ghp2k>
X-BeenThere: i-d-announce@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Internet Draft Announcements only <i-d-announce.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i-d-announce>, <mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i-d-announce/>
List-Post: <mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce>, <mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 02:39:24 -0000

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.


        Title           : The OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol
        Author          : Hugo Krawczyk
	Filename        : draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-04.txt
	Pages           : 27
	Date            : 2020-05-14

Abstract:
   This draft describes the OPAQUE protocol, a secure asymmetric
   password authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) that supports mutual
   authentication in a client-server setting without reliance on PKI and
   with security against pre-computation attacks upon server compromise.
   Prior aPAKE protocols did not use salt and if they did, the salt was
   transmitted in the clear from server to user allowing for the
   building of targeted pre-computed dictionaries.  OPAQUE security has
   been proven by Jarecki et al.  (Eurocrypt 2018) in a strong and
   universally composable formal model of aPAKE security.  In addition,
   the protocol provides forward secrecy and the ability to hide the
   password from the server even during password registration.

   Strong security, versatility through modularity, good performance,
   and an array of additional features make OPAQUE a natural candidate
   for practical use and for adoption as a standard.  To this end, this
   draft presents several instantiations of OPAQUE and ways of
   integrating OPAQUE with TLS.

   This draft presents a high-level description of OPAQUE highlighting
   its components and modular design.  It also provides the basis for a
   specification for standardization but a detailed specification ready
   for implementation is beyond the current scope of this document
   (which may be expanded in future revisions or done separately).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-04
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-04

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-04


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/