I-D Action: draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.


        Title           : The OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol
        Author          : Hugo Krawczyk
	Filename        : draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2018-12-27

Abstract:
   This draft describes the OPAQUE protocol, a secure asymmetric
   password authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) that supports mutual
   authentication in a client-server setting without any reliance on
   PKI.  OPAQUE is the first PKI-free aPAKE to accommodate secret salt
   and therefore it is the first to be secure against pre-computation
   attacks upon server compromise.  In contrast, prior aPAKE protocols
   did not use salt and if they did, the salt was transmitted in the
   clear from server to user allowing for the building of targeted
   pre-computed dictionaries.  OPAQUE security has been proven by
   Jarecki et al.  (Eurocrypt 2018) in a strong and universally
   composable formal model of aPAKE security.  In addition, the protocol
   provides forward secrecy and the ability to hide the password from
   the server even during password registration.

   Strong security, good performance and an array of additional features
   make OPAQUE a natural candidate for practical use and for adoption as
   a standard.  To this end, this draft presents several optimized
   instantiations of OPAQUE and ways of integrating OPAQUE with TLS.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01


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