Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM
Andy Bierman <andy@yumaworks.com> Thu, 16 February 2017 20:49 UTC
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From: Andy Bierman <andy@yumaworks.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2017 12:49:13 -0800
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To: Susan Hares <shares@ndzh.com>
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Subject: Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM
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Hi, I am most concerned about getting the architecture right. We have ignored server-created nodes until now. I am glad I2RS WG is trying to deal with the problem. Just make sure we have a reusable solution. Also concerned about tool automation. There was some discussion of a 'server-created' extension at some point I think. This would help, because the server-created leaf is not really deterministic. It is just a convention. e.g. container networks { list network { i2rs:server-created; ... leaf server-created { ... } ... } } Andy On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 11:47 AM, Susan Hares <shares@ndzh.com> wrote: > Andy: > > <chair hat off, individual contributor hat on> > > > > AFAIK – I believe the revised data store model is right approach. It is > an important question to ask whether the ability to have a mixture of > “server-provided” and “configured” is important for all topology models. I > hope Xufeng and other topology models will comment on this point. > > > > > > Does the NETCONF data store in the revised data-store future include the > control plane data stores? I thought the answer was “no” it does not. > Here’s some text from draft-ietf-netconf-rfc6536bis that leads me to > believe that > > > > On NACM, draft-ietf-netconf-rfc6536bis it says: > > > > It is necessary to control access to specific nodes and subtrees > > within the NETCONF datastore, regardless of which protocol operation, > > standard or proprietary, was used to access the datastore. > > > 3.2 > <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-rfc6536bis-00#section-3.2>. > Datastore Access > > The same access control rules apply to all datastores, for example, > > the candidate configuration datastore or the running configuration > > datastore. > > > > Only the standard NETCONF datastores (candidate, running, and > > startup) are controlled by NACM. Local or remote files or datastores > > accessed via the <url> parameter are not controlled by NACM. A > > standalone RESTCONF server (i.e., not co-located with a NETCONF > > server) applies NACM rules to a conceptual datastore, since > > datastores are not supported in RESTCONF. > > > > > > =========== > > > > The I2RS security environment actually looks at 3 policies on the server > > > > Network Access ß-à server ß-à routing-system access > > (aka I2RS agent) > > |ßà System access > > > > It also looks at application access to the client > > > > Network accessßà client ßà application-access > > > > > > The protocol only needs to consider the NACM Access, but the routing > infrastructure need to consider the server to/from routing system, and > server to/from system. My understanding is that the Routing system access > control module (RACM) and the system access control module (SACM) functions > were not in NACM. > > > > Thanks again for posting, > > > > Sue > > > > *From:* i2rs [mailto:i2rs-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Andy Bierman > *Sent:* Thursday, February 16, 2017 2:00 PM > *To:* i2rs@ietf.org > *Subject:* [i2rs] topo model use of NACM > > > > Hi, > > > > The use of NACM for server-provided data is under-specified (at best) > > > > > > from sec. 4.1: > > > > Finally, there is an object "server-provided". This object is state > > that indicates how the network came into being. Network data can > > come into being in one of two ways. In one way, network data is > > configured by client applications, for example in case of overlay > > networks that are configured by an SDN Controller application. In > > annother way, it is populated by the server, in case of networks that > > can be discovered. > > > > If server-provided is set to false, the network was configured by a > > client application, for example in the case of an overlay network > > that is configured by a controller application. If server-provided > > is set to true, the network was populated by the server itself, > > respectively an application on the server that is able to discover > > the network. *Client applications SHOULD NOT modify configurations of* > > * networks for which "server-provided" is true.* When they do, they > > need to be aware that any modifications they make are subject to be > > reverted by the server. For servers that support NACM (Netconf > > Access Control Model), *data node rules should ideally prevent* write > > access by other clients to network instances for which server- > > provided is set to true. > > > > The SHOULD NOT above is really odd, considering is not supported by YANG > > or the NC/RC protocols. > > > > "data node rules should ideally prevent" > > > > s/should/SHOULD/ > > > > Ideally prevent? > > Is that a new engineering term? > > Either this new usage of NACM works or it doesn't. > > > > Also, there is no guidance or examples of the NACM config that the > > server is supposed to magically create for server-provided topology data. > > There is nothing in NACM at all about server-created data rules. > > This is not supported by NACM. > > > > Does the I2RS text imply that the server-provided property extends > > to the NACM sub-trees? They are also subject to replacement by the server? > > The client SHOULD NOT change these NACM rules? > > > > IMO the way this server-provided property is being done is a short-sighted > > point solution, but this should be a fundamental part of the revised > datastores work. > > Is there something special about network topology such that > > server-provided data for a different module will require a different > > solution? If not, is the topo module solution reusable? > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > >
- [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Andy Bierman
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Susan Hares
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Susan Hares
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Andy Bierman
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Alexander Clemm
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Andy Bierman
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Alexander Clemm
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Kent Watsen
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Robert Wilton
- Re: [i2rs] topo model use of NACM Andy Bierman