Last Call: <draft-mglt-ipsecme-clone-ike-sa-05.txt> (Cloning IKE SA in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)) to Proposed Standard

The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> Tue, 29 September 2015 21:46 UTC

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From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Subject: Last Call: <draft-mglt-ipsecme-clone-ike-sa-05.txt> (Cloning IKE SA in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)) to Proposed Standard
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Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 14:46:46 -0700
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The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider
the following document:
- 'Cloning IKE SA in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)'
  <draft-mglt-ipsecme-clone-ike-sa-05.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-10-27. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document considers a VPN End User establishing an IPsec SA with
   a Security Gateway using the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
   (IKEv2), where at least one of the peers has multiple interfaces or
   where Security Gateway is a cluster with each node having its own IP
   address.

   With the current IKEv2 protocol, the outer IP addresses of the IPsec
   SA are determined by those used by IKE SA.  As a result using
   multiple interfaces requires to set up an IKE SA on each interface,
   or on each path if both the VPN Client and the Security Gateway have
   multiple interfaces.  Setting each IKE SA involves authentications
   which might require multiple round trips as well as activity from the
   VPN End User and thus would delay the VPN establishment.  In addition
   multiple authentications unnecessarily increase the load on the VPN
   client and the authentication infrastructure.

   This document presents the solution that allows to clone IKEv2 SA,
   where an additional SA is derived from an existing one.  The newly
   created IKE SA is set without the IKEv2 authentication exchange.
   This IKE SA can later be assigned to another interface or moved to
   another cluster mode using MOBIKE protocol.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mglt-ipsecme-clone-ike-sa/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mglt-ipsecme-clone-ike-sa/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.