BCP 185, RFC 9319 on The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org Fri, 21 October 2022 19:16 UTC

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Subject: BCP 185, RFC 9319 on The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        BCP 185        
        RFC 9319

        Title:      The Use of maxLength in 
                    the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) 
        Author:     Y. Gilad,
                    S. Goldberg,
                    K. Sriram,
                    J. Snijders,
                    B. Maddison
        Status:     Best Current Practice
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       October 2022
        Mailbox:    yossigi@cs.huji.ac.il,
                    goldbe@cs.bu.edu,
                    kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov,
                    job@fastly.com,
                    benm@workonline.africa
        Pages:      13
        See Also:   BCP 185

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-15.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC9319

This document recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin hijack
attack surface by prudently limiting the set of IP prefixes that are
included in a Route Origin Authorization (ROA). One recommendation is
to avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some
specific cases. The recommendations complement and extend those in
RFC 7115. This document also discusses the creation of ROAs for
facilitating the use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
mitigation services. Considerations related to ROAs and RPKI-based
Route Origin Validation (RPKI-ROV) in the context of
destination-based Remotely Triggered Discard Route (RTDR) (elsewhere
referred to as "Remotely Triggered Black Hole") filtering are also
highlighted.

This document is a product of the SIDR Operations Working Group of the IETF.


BCP: This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the
Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for 
improvements. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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