[Ietf-dkim] Re: Insisting that From is authentic

Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com> Sun, 20 September 2026 15:12 UTC

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Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 16:10:37 +0100
To: ietf-dkim@ietf.org
From: Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com>
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: Insisting that From is authentic
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In message <0ADC0EBD-168E-4451-BB93-B56E1CF0F94F@episteme.net>, Pete
Resnick <resnick@episteme.net> writes

>[Without my chair hat on. This is basically a technical comment, but I 
>do think this framing will get it through the process a bit easier.]
>
>On 31 Aug 2026, at 9:32, Richard Clayton wrote:
>
>> We update the spec to say that when a From field is first placed into 
>> a
>> message (ie it sits alongside an i=1 DKIM2-Signature) or when it is
>> changed by an intermediary (there is a recipe that shows that it has
>> been changed at a particular hop) then DKIM2 will insist that there is
>> match between the d= domain being used to sign and the domain in the
>> RFC5322 From header field.
>
>If the group wants to go down this path (and it's sounding like it 
>does), I would very much suggest that the requirement gets put on the 
>generator and not on the interpreter: 

by which I assume you mean "Verifier"

>Make the requirement that the 
>domain in the From: header field MUST sign the message. Then we don't 
>get into the business of telling receivers what they need to do with the 
>message.

we could do this by making the requirement on a Verifier that they MAY
reject the message and MUST NOT forward it outside their org. That way
we have a place to specify a canonical rejection message (which assists
with interworking / debugging etc)

>Note that this is an explicit change from DKIM1: In DKIM1,

but not from DMARC ...

> the semantic 
>content of the message was explicitly ignored; the only thing it told 
>you is that some domain signed the message, and it acted strictly at the 
>SMTP layer. If we go down this path, in DKIM2 we would be saying that 
>the signature (or at least one signature) depends on the x22 content of 
>the message. I'm not saying that's wrong; I'm simply saying that we 
>should be explicit about that in the document if this is the path we 
>choose.

... and it is not a change from what pretty much all email with DKIM1
signatures does today; viz: this is going to actually affect almost no-
one apart perhaps from really old systems which are not DKIM1 signing
today -- if they are authenticating at all it is by using SPF

- -- 
richard @ highwayman . com                       "Nothing seems the same
                          Still you never see the change from day to day
                                And no-one notices the customs slip away"

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