[Ietf-dkim] Re: Hackathon day 1 report -- draft-clayton-dkim2-spec-08 review

Hannah Stern <hannah.stern@1und1.de> Tue, 17 March 2026 16:02 UTC

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References: <47baafa2-200e-4bfb-923d-79ec9a0eb21d@app.fastmail.com> <Z3TFLXBXwhtpFAW2@highwayman.com>
From: Hannah Stern <hannah.stern@1und1.de>
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: Hackathon day 1 report -- draft-clayton-dkim2-spec-08 review
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Hi!

On 3/15/26 03:40, Richard Clayton wrote:
> In message <47baafa2-200e-4bfb-923d-79ec9a0eb21d@app.fastmail.com>, Bron
> Gondwana <brong=40fastmailteam.com@dmarc.ietf.org> writes

>> The following review has been generated (with some input by me) from two copies
>> of Claude Code

> my reply is all mine !

Same.

> [...]
>> The interleaved ordering is the correct semantic interpretation: when sig i=1
>> was created, only MI v=1 existed. The signing input for sig i=2 should
>> reflect the full chain of headers as they were added in sequence.

> that would be complex to code because you would need to inspect the DS
> header fields to see which MIs existed (recall that DS counts are likely
> to be higher than MI counts).

Basically a merge-like algorithm between the M-I and the D2-S arrays.
Perfectly doable but I'd think still not advisable.

> you might get some saving for the verification process from being able
> to hold some intermediate hash states rather than having to start from
> the beginning every time ... but there is some complexity to doing that

Only with hash implementations that expose a copyable hash state.

And the savings are probably extremely minimal.

> and it may be that that saving is not available in some signature
> schemes (recall that for DS we don't publish the hash because the
> signature itself may provide that as part of its design)

Note that, as far as I understand, for ed25519 we do hash first
externally (with sha256), even though the ed25519 primitive hashes
again (it's defined that way for DKIM1 and we refer to that).

So here we _do_ reuse the hash values, as far as I understand,
between rsa-sha256 and ed25519-sha256.

> [...]

> So the issue is that we would rather like the signature to include the
> selector values, but because we can have multiple selectors (one for
> each of the signatures that are provided) I moved the selector string
> into the JSON structure for the message signature and did not realise
> that stopped it being signed.

> So we will need to provide a JSON structure (with the selector strings
> and, why not, the algorithm names) but with no actual signature text. We
> then need to base64 encode that, put it into the DKIM2-Signature header
> field that is being constructed and then calculate the signature(s).

Please not.  JSON serialization isn't defined uniquely.

And some signer/verifier might wrap the base64 at different places
(which leaves SP inside the base64 even after canonicalization).

Like if they use the same code for constructing a D2-S "template"
here, and constructing the final D2-S header field.

> The simple thing is to have the signature values be absent .. which is
> nice and simple. That probably makes the blob invalid JSON but are
> people going to do a "check this is valid JSON" step every time they
> throw a string at their base64 encoder ??

In theory that could be empty strings or that element be completely
absent, for valid JSON.  But still please don't.


> I will fix this error in -09 (RSN)

Please not like this.  See my other reply for discussion/suggestions
that are (I hope) not so fragile.

>> 3. Header ordering for duplicates in header hash (Section 5.2) — INTEROP FAILURE

>> The spec says duplicate headers with the same field name are “placed in the
>> order in which they occur in the message header, from the top downwards.”
>> Two of three implementations use bottom-to-top (reverse message order).
>> On a message with 5 authentication-results headers, both orderings produce
>> 24 canonicalized headers totalling 2753 bytes but completely different hashes.
>> *Suggested fix:* Clarify which direction. Either works as long as all
>> implementations agree.

> Since implementations will construct (the moral equivalent of) an array
> for each header field name in bottom-to-top order (because they will
> need this to deal with any recipes) it seems perverse to have another
> ordering for the signing algorithm.

> So I will change this in -09 (penalising the implementations written by
> people who did what they were previously told)

Why?  Why not consistently top-down, incl. in recipes?  Like in bodies
(possible implementation synergy!)?

>> 4. s= tag JSON schema — “items” keyword collision (Section 7)

>> The signature JSON schema uses `"items"` as both a property name and a JSON
>> Schema keyword. Three implementations produced three interpretations:
>> 1. `{"items": ["selector", "algorithm", "value"]}` — literal object reading
>> 2. `["selector", "rsa", "sig", "selector2", "ed25519", "sig2"]` — flat array
>> 3. `[["sel1", "rsa", "<sig>"], ["sel2", "ed25519", "<sig>"]]` — array-of-arrays
>> *Suggested fix:* Replace the JSON Schema with a concrete wire format
>> example showing the expected structure before and after base64 encoding.
>> Array of arrays is most clear in the multi-algorithm case.
>> Spec Bugs

> Not using a JSON schema runs counter to the rest of the design... and
> having a property name clash with a schema reserved word is not wrong
> per se...  but it is a dumb name so lets make it "s"

> So (without most of the semantic stuff)

> {
>    "type": "object",
>    "properties": {
>      "s": {
>        "description": "selector, algorithm, value",
>        "type": "array",
>        "items": {"type": "string"}
>      }
>    }
> }

> Also ... there exist online resources that allow you to take a string
> and determine what the schema requires

> which in this case is

> {
>    "s": ["selector1", "rsa", "00000"],
>    "s": ["selector2", "PQ1", "99999"]
> }

> For -09 I will change it to use "s"

No, that doesn't work.

JSON doesn't allow duplicate keys in "objects".

And the "s" would provide no information.

Nested arrays would be simpler:

[
   ["sel1", "rsa", "111"],
   ["sel2", "ed25519", "222"]
]

> [...]
> hmm... jsonschema.dev was happy, but jsonlint.com agrees with the AI

Did you see my feedback on -07?  I didn't use tools but just looked
at the schemas and was confused.

(And I'm a bit confused now that this discussion happens completely
sidestepping that feedback.)

 > [...]

> I did not attempt to put in all the IANA stuff because (as you will see
> when looking at the DKIM1 RFC) there is a LOT of verbiage, and while we
> are still pinning down the tags it creates twice as much work to update
> the document.

For my sake it makes sense to just note for what we do want registries
and for what we don't need them, but to flesh them out only at the end.

>[...]

>> 15. Signing input worked example needed (Section 11.5)

>> A complete worked example showing a sample message, its MI/DK2 headers, the
>> canonicalized signing input (byte-for-byte), and the resulting hash/signature
>> would be invaluable. This was the most common source of interop failures.

> yes, but does it belong in a specification document ?

Some crypto heavy documents do provide test vectors, so there's some
precedent.

But I'm not sure if it's strictly needed here.

>[...]

Hannah.
-- 
Hannah Stern

Software Developer
Mail Transfer Development

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