[Ietf-dkim] Re: Proposal key validity field vor DKIM2

Timo Gerke <ietf@timogerke.de> Thu, 24 September 2026 15:26 UTC

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From: Timo Gerke <ietf@timogerke.de>
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: Proposal key validity field vor DKIM2
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Hi Pete and Murray,
Hi all,

I still do not want to argue with you, but a slight controversy
is part of all discussions. I actually do not plan initiating
a WG Dispute Resolution, but I may consider it, if more
processual failures happen.

Regards,
Timo


It looks like Pete Resnick aimed to say:
> On 23 Sep 2026, at 14:26, Timo Gerke wrote:
> 
>> The core foundation of IETF consensus engineering under BCP 25
>> (RFC 2418) and RFC 7282 is strictly bound to technical quality
>> and the mitigation of architectural flaws, not to the
>> mathematical counting of unaligned voices.
> 
> Yes, but engineering is an exercise in weighing different approaches. 
> Almost inevitably, the choices we make will have certain items in their 
> favor and some against. Unless the collective engineering wisdom of the 
> group is that a flaw is fatal, consensus can decide that a flaw is worth 
> living with. I believe what Murray and I are both saying is that the 
> flaw you are pointing out does not put the product of the WG in 
> jeopardy, and so the (albeit rough) consensus is that the group will not 
> be making a change.
> 
>> To address Hannah's recent validation on the wire layer: I never
>> said that REST APIs are forbidden or should be forbidden. But the
>> specification should strictly allow O(n+d) implementations only.
>>
>> When a core security specification willingly permits undefined
>> execution bounds (RFC 8259, Section 4) causing an
>> application-layer semantic collapse, dismissing this structural
>> vulnerability
>> as a non-unanimous minority opinion violates the very core of
>> architectural accountability.
> 
> On the contrary, whether something is a "structural vulnerability" or is 
> "violating the very core of architectural accountability" is an 
> engineering judgement call that needs to be made on the basis of the 
> collective wisdom of the group, and we judge the outcome of that 
> collective wisdom by determining rough consensus. In this case, the 
> rough consensus appears to be that the current spec does not have a 
> significant structural vulnerability nor violates the very core of 
> architectural accountability. One may disagree with that judgement, but 
> we have a mechanism to adjudicate such a disagreement as described in 
> RFC 2026 6.5.
> 
>> If the working group architecture chooses to bypass documented
>> algorithmic complexity exploits prior to state execution, the
>> process failure is absolute.
> 
> No, the working group can judge that the exploits are of low enough 
> concern that other considerations (ease of deployment, processing speed, 
> whatever) outweigh. If that's what's determined, the process has 
> absolutely succeeded.
> 
>> My goal was never to attack you or Pete under $ 6.5.1 of RFC 2026
>> I just wanted you to know that I MAY consider it.
> 
> The use of 6.5.1 is not an attack at all, and I can assure you neither 
> Murray nor I view it that way. Chairs can and do make errors, both in 
> their judgement of the consensus and whether raised issues have been 
> properly addressed. 6.5.1 is a way to assure that an error is caught. 
> But you also must allow that the person raising the concern is wrong, 
> not the chairs or the WG as a whole.
> 
> pr
> 
>> It looks like Murray S. Kucherawy aimed to say:
>>> On Tue, Sep 22, 2026 at 12:56 AM Timo Gerke <ietf@timogerke.de> 
>>> wrote:
>>>> It may not be binding, but it is lived daily routine.
>>>>
>>>> This is not just bad practice; it is an absolute catastrophe. If
>>>> you willingly use an Informational perspective against me to
>>>> dismiss mathematically proven parsing vulnerabilities and enforce
>>>> this "routine" over core technical safety, you are risking an
>>>> appeal regardin pursuant  § 6.5.1 of RFC 2026.
>>>
>>> You're conflating your technical argument with how consensus is
>>> evaluated.  I've taken no position on the former.
>>>
>>> You've made a claim (which Pete has challenged) that two people 
>>> agreed
>>> with your assessment, thereby negating the notion that consensus
>>> exists.  Pete correctly pointed out that (a) consensus calls are the
>>> purview of the Chair, and (b) by referencing RFC 7282, that
>>> "consensus" and "unanimity" are not synonyms.
>>>
>>>> Under BCP 25 (RFC 2418), checking for consensus must remain a
>>>> transparent, deterministic process based on technical quality,
>>>> not an arbitrary "lived routine"  used to bypass architectural
>>>> accountability.
>>>
>>> Consensus is also, by pure definition, "a general or widespread
>>> agreement among the members of a group."  As Pete also pointed out,
>>> thus far there has not been a "general or widespread" swing of group
>>> agreement toward your position.  If you wish, I can point you to 
>>> prior
>>> appeals to the IESG and then the IAB where a singular position
>>> asserting a serious quality defect in a proposed standard failed to
>>> sway the group's consensus, and the document proceeded to 
>>> publication.
>>> There was at least one such appeal during my Area Director term.
>>>
>>> The record lays plain the fact that you have not been ignored, which
>>> would certainly be grounds for redress.  Rather, the group has 
>>> engaged
>>> with you in good faith and on the record.  That, so far, consensus 
>>> has
>>> not changed in the direction you wish is not, I claim, a process
>>> failure.  It is, conversely, evidence of precisely the opposite.
>>>
>>> If you still wish to avail yourself of the appeal process under BCPs 
>>> 9
>>> and 25, your next step is Andy Newton, who is on this list.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -MSK
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>
>>
>> Timo Gerke
>> Hamburg, Germany
>>
>> "If you think technology can solve your security
>>  problems then you don't understand the problems
>>  and you don't understand the technology."
>>    -- Bruce Schneier
> 
> 
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Timo Gerke
Hamburg, Germany

"If you think technology can solve your security
 problems then you don't understand the problems
 and you don't understand the technology."
   -- Bruce Schneier