[ietf-dkim] Re: The Value of Reputation

[Frank Ellermann <[e-mail]>]

Stephen Farrell wrote:

> there will be a time when the group should be focusing on
> the policy stuff, but its just not yet. For now we ought be
> focusing on the threats draft.

s/now/tomorrow/ after the WG is chartered... ;-)  I think I've
now got Doug's terminology of "closed" vs. "open", it 's like
"open interval" vs. "closed interval" for real numbers.

In that case it's wrong / esoteric / dubious (pick what you
like) for sets of IPs, because there's only a finite number of
IPs.  We don't need "open intervals" or the "axiom of choice"
to construct say three sets FAIL, PASS, and DUNNO covering all
IPs, with each IP in precisely one of these three sets.

> You also ought accept that making the same "not ssp" point
> in a million ways doesn't make it a new point.  We all know
> that you don't like ssp.  There's no need to tell us again.

Yes, but he might be up to something real.  Keith _also_ said
that we might need a new "opaque-id".  William specified a new
"submitter" for spf2.0/submit, compatible with the "submitter"
in the [draft-katz-submitter] RfC, but completely independent
of PRA.

Maybe they (Doug / Keith / William) see something that we still
fail to see.  That I fail to see it is no big surprise, because
I think that the Return-Path should do the trick.  But that
does not help for DKIM + SSP, DKIM cannot use the Return-Path.

This "opaque-id" could be a new general concept, some kind of
an improved crypto-PRA-cum-Message-ID, with DKIM as its first
serious application.

Well, I see where this might be "off topic" starting tomorrow.
But if they (Doug / Keith / William) are right I seriously
hope that it's ready before the future DKIM WG tries to tackle
SSP.  And I hope that Keith will be the editor of this obscure
beast, because so far I always understood what he talks about,
while Doug often and William sometimes are beyond me.

> The comment was more directed to the rest of the folks
> discussing this with you over and over.

If what he says about SPF is wrong / dubious I've to challenge
it, and I also don't see any "open-endedness" in SSP so far:

Every domain is free to send no mail, and to publish this as
"v=spf1 -all" or nullmx or what else.  It's also free to say
that it only uses certain routes, or always uses some kind of
signature, etc., and to publish this decision in a policy.

If that hurts users they can vote with their feet.  Bye, Frank


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