[Ietf-dkim] Re: Call for adoption: draft-gondwana-dkim2-header-02 (Ends 2025-10-27)

"Inveigle.net" <cs@inveigle.net> Mon, 13 October 2025 23:08 UTC

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Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 12:08:39 +1300
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Subject: [Ietf-dkim] Re: Call for adoption: draft-gondwana-dkim2-header-02 (Ends 2025-10-27)
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On 14/10/2025 8:08 am, Murray Kucherawy via Datatracker wrote:
> Please reply to this message keeping ietf-dkim@ietf.org in copy by indicating
> whether you support or not the adoption of this draft as a WG document.
> Comments to motivate your preference are highly appreciated.

I do NOT support adoption of draft-gondwana-dkim2-header-02.

My objection relates to the use of the rt= tag, the rules surrounding 
how multiple active headers are handled (including some seemingly 
contradictory statements), the risk of data leakage and loss of freedom 
of implementation.

Without being a party to the side discussions that resulted in previous 
revisions allowing multiple active headers, as I interpret it, this is 
intended to allow a signer to insert one signed header for each intended 
recipient that then MUST be removed by the server when it relays the 
message. This addresses concerns I have expressed previously, from the 
point of view of a sender, but it introduces other risks that can easily 
be avoided. If this was not the intent, then this concern remains.

Section 7.1 imposes a requirement on the creator/sender to ensure no 
data leakage, however, DKIM implementations usually have no knowledge of 
e-mail routing. Filters, where DKIM is usually implemented, also do not 
have knowledge of their clients/hosts capabilities and if configured 
incorrectly, could include rt= header variants that it expects would be 
subsequently removed by the SMTP host (which it believes to be DKIM2 
capable) or at the next hop, but actually aren't.

While the addition of an ESMTP DKIM2 option appears unavoidable given 
the greater objectives of DKIM2 (independent of the header document), it 
is undesirable to entrench DKIM2 requirements within SMTP itself in a 
way that that would lead to loss of flexibility, including choice of 
implementation. DKIM1 caters to a wide range of signing and verification 
scenarios and it's critical we not sacrifice those, despite some 
individuals being outright dismissive of certain valid use cases.

Given the requirement for DKIM2 support to be negotiated and the 
guarantees advertising this ESMTP option would mandate, there is no 
barrier to moving the signature to the envelope en route, via RCPT TO. 
There are, however, advantages in doing so. This relatively small change 
would ensure the maximum extent of BCC disclosure would be no greater 
than it currently is, even if systems were misconfigured. It would also 
eliminate the requirement to split messages at the earliest opportunity 
as BCC'd recipients and their associated hashes would never be seen by 
any server other than that those to which it was intentionally sent. In 
doing so, it also preserves existing use cases.

The only point at which splitting messages would be required would be on 
handover to systems that do not support DKIM2 or on delivery, at which 
time a header would be added containing a hash that would be verifiable 
using a key that was already used to sign the e-mail. As the e-mail 
would only have a single recipient at that point, this would be 
functionally equivalent to including only the active DKIM2-Signature 
with a corresponding rh= hash.

While I did mention this approach in an earlier e-mail on this list, it 
did not elicit much discussion, although the need to retain 
compatibility with RSA was suggested. While I favour removing RSA 
altogether, the RSA case could be handled by simply including a hash of 
the calculated signature instead of the signature itself. The hashing 
algorithm need only be sufficient to guard against collisions, but for 
simplicity, I'd suggest SHA-256 as that's what is mandated elsewhere.

The resulting RCPT TO and header would look something like this...

RCPT TO <user@example.com> 
DKIM2-RCPT=rt=user@example.com;s=selector;h=oTjChbUP05I+4PXR8wSHTpuy+q/uV9MrnCss8l+J3Js=;i=1
DKIM2-Recipient: 
rt=user@example.com;s=selector;h=oTjChbUP05I+4PXR8wSHTpuy+q/uV9MrnCss8l+J3Js=;i=1

Similar to the DKIM2-Signature header itself, this would be a signed 
hash of the DKIM2-Signature (as identified by the s= and i= value) and 
the RCTP TO/DKIM2-Recipient string as above, with an empty h= value 
filled in after the value is calculated.

I'm also uncertain how I am meant to lookup keys. In DKIM1, s= and d= 
combine to give me this information, but d= is described in the document 
as always matching the domain of the return-path, which shouldn't 
change. Is the intent to combine this into s= (like ds= in revision 00)?

Regards,
R. Latimer
Inveigle.net