[ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about using TLS with email protocols
Keith Moore <moore@network-heretics.com> Wed, 23 October 2013 17:48 UTC
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Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 13:48:01 -0400
From: Keith Moore <moore@network-heretics.com>
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Subject: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about using TLS with email protocols
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I'd like to call the list's attention to two other Internet-Drafts regarding use of TLS with email protocols: 1. draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-00 <http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane/> This is (mostly) about SMTP mail relaying using Opportunistic TLS, and how to make it work well by using TLSA records to both (a) provide a secure indication that the SMTP server supports STARTTLS (thus thwarting MITM downgrading attacks) and (b) provide a way to verify that the SMTP server is the right server (given a chain of DNSSEC-signed MX/CNAME/A/AAAA etc. records) without requiring the server to present a TLS certificate for every possible DNS name for which that server is authorized to accept mail. The document seems to be fairly well written and worked out in a decent amount of detail. It proposes Opportunistic TLS rather than an SMTP extension or message header that would require secure delivery for the entire path. For mail relaying I think Opportunistic TLS is a more realizable goal. But even if people want to propose an SMTP extension to mandate use of TLS for the remainder of the path to the recipient, I think it would need to use the certificate verification mechanisms described in this draft. 2. draft-moore-email-tls-00 <http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moore-email-tls/> This is a document recommending use of TLS in all interactions between MUAs and mail servers (IMAP, POP, Submission). It basically has two sets of recommendations - one for client and server implementations, and another for mail service providers - because there are operational as well as implementation concerns. This started out to be a document recommending TLS for both MUA-MSP interactions and for mail relaying, but it turned out that the two cases are different enough that trying to specify both in the same document made it too large and complex. When I discovered that draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-00 existed and used the same approach I was recommending, and also that the dane-smtp draft had things worked out in more detail, I removed the portions from my draft that related to SMTP relaying. To me it seems that a comprehensive approach to encrypting email traffic actually needs to cover three separate cases: (1) mail relaying, (2) MUA-MSP interactions, and (3) end-to-end encryption. Cases (1) and (2) are similar in goal - protect emails being transmitted over the network from eavesdroppers and active attacks - but subtly different in implementation. Case (3) protects emails from being disclosed to servers which are operated by third parties and which might be compromised. None of these is sufficient by itself, because (1) and (2) by themselves don't protect the messages while they're stored on third-party servers, and (3) doesn't protect against traffic analysis - which when dealing with mass surveillance seems to be as important as protecting the actual contents of the messages. Of these, the most difficult problem seems to be (3). Solutions for (3) e.g. PGP and S/MIME have been around for a long time, but they haven't been widely deployed. This seems like an area that is worth revisiting. Keith
- [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandatory S… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Timo Sirainen
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Martijn Grooten
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… John C Klensin
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… SM
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Paul Smith
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Timo Sirainen
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… MH Michael Hammer (5304)
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Martijn Grooten
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… John C Klensin
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… John C Klensin
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… John C Klensin
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Carl S. Gutekunst
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John C Klensin
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Brandon Long
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Arnt Gulbrandsen
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Timo Sirainen
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John C Klensin
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Richard Clayton
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Robert A. Rosenberg
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Russ Allbery
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Arnt Gulbrandsen
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Martijn Grooten
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Rolf E. Sonneveld
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Steve Atkins
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Martijn Grooten
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Richard Clayton
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Request for discussion of Mandato… SM
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … SM
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Rolf E. Sonneveld
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Rolf E. Sonneveld
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John C Klensin
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Russ Allbery
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John R Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Martijn Grooten
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Steve Atkins
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Martijn Grooten
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … James Cloos
- Re: [ietf-smtp] DKIM encryption, was Request for … Wei Chuang
- [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about usin… Keith Moore
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Paul Smith
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Stephan Bosch
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Rolf E. Sonneveld
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Keith Moore
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … John Levine
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Brandon Long
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Wei Chuang
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Ned Freed
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Two recent Internet-Drafts about … Paul Smith
- [ietf-smtp] Review of draft-moore-email-tls-00.txt Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [ietf-smtp] Review of draft-moore-email-tls-0… Keith Moore