Re: Postel's Principle and Layer 9 protocol engineering

Fred Baker <fredbaker.ietf@gmail.com> Sun, 06 June 2021 20:05 UTC

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From: Fred Baker <fredbaker.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: Postel's Principle and Layer 9 protocol engineering
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Date: Sun, 06 Jun 2021 13:05:25 -0700
Cc: LMM@acm.org, emil@jitsi.org, ietf@ietf.org, jared@puck.nether.net
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To: Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com>
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I’m curious what the average number of words are used in a FB post, and the average number of words are in a technical discussion. My belief is that FB would be difficult to use (as would Twitter) because comments are usually short.

Sent using a machine that autocorrects in interesting ways...

> On Jun 6, 2021, at 11:49 AM, Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> -------- Original Message --------
> On Jun 6, 2021, 1:13 PM, Larry Masinter < LMM@acm.org> wrote:
> ...
>  
> But banning someone is very different from delaying their posting
> for a reasonable length of time. Especially if the algorithm used
> is clear enough that participants who value the ability to
> communicate without delay can readily choose other ways
> of expressing their perspective, without resorting to hyperbole.
>  
> ----
> 
> Larry, they didn't "delay my posting for a reasonable length of time. " They permanently blocked my comment, denied the appeal, and banned me from using Facebook for any purpose for 24 hours. As I understand it, they use an escalating scale, so the next time they make this mistake it's a week ban, then two, then a month...
> 
> Given that MY current employer (for better or worse) is an agency that literally runs on top of social media platforms, said 24 hour ban literally blocks my income stream and the business operations of my clients. Now, perhaps that's my problem and I have a business Facebook dependency to resolve, which I will do...
> 
> But my essential point is that given these sorts of risks the IETF MUST NOT rely on social media platforms -- in particular Facebook (because that's where we have an objective instance to analyze as a threat model) -- where said platform is likely to invoke automated censorship in such a way that users must self-censor commonly used terms of art in order to avoid being expelled from the platform. 
> 
> Literally last month we were circulating a survey asking people about doing IETF work on social media platforms. And while we have had a few technical discussions on Facebook and other platforms, I don't think we've thought our way through the implications of working that way.
> 
> --
> Dean
>