Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-12.txt> (BGPsec Operational Considerations) to Best Current Practice

Job Snijders <job@instituut.net> Sat, 17 December 2016 18:26 UTC

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Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2016 19:26:10 +0100
From: Job Snijders <job@instituut.net>
To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-12.txt> (BGPsec Operational Considerations) to Best Current Practice
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Cc: Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, sidr-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops@ietf.org, IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>, sidr@ietf.org
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Hi all,

This following paragraph looks somewhat awkward to me.

TEXT:
    An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its
    upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and
    need not validate received announcements.

COMMENT:
    If you are multihomed and receive full (or partial) tables, there is
    benefit in validating the received routes, if not: why not? One
    upstream might be poisoned while the other isn't? Mabye the text
    should be amended to make it clear that this might apply if the stub
    ASN only takes default-originates?

Kind regards,

Job

On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 07:27:28AM -0800, The IESG wrote:
> 
> The IESG has received a request from the Secure Inter-Domain Routing WG
> (sidr) to consider the following document:
> - 'BGPsec Operational Considerations'
>   <draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-12.txt> as Best Current Practice
> 
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2016-12-21. Exceptionally, comments may be
> sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
> 
> Abstract
> 
> 
>    Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
>    operational considerations.  This document attempts to collect and
>    present the most critical and universal.  It is expected to evolve as
>    BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The file can be obtained via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops/
> 
> IESG discussion can be tracked via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops/ballot/
> 
> 
> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
> 
> 
> The document contains these normative downward references.
> See RFC 3967 for additional information: 
>     rfc6811: BGP Prefix Origin Validation (Proposed Standard - IETF stream)
>     draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol: BGPsec Protocol Specification (None - IETF stream)
>     rfc6493: The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Ghostbusters Record (Proposed Standard - IETF stream)
> Note that some of these references may already be listed in the acceptable Downref Registry.
> 
>