November '93 IETF: Common Authentication Technology WG (cat)
John Linn <linn@gza.com> Mon, 25 October 1993 13:56 UTC
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From: John Linn <linn@gza.com>
Subject: November '93 IETF: Common Authentication Technology WG (cat)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 1993 09:54:31 -0400
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Group Name: Common Authentication Technology WG (cat) IETF Area: Security Date/Time: Tuesday, November 2, 1993: 1330-1530 Wednesday, November 3, 1993: topics for CAT at Houston IETF (Tuesday, 1330-1530 and Wednesday, 1600-1800):1600-1800 ---- Agenda: (1) Administrative issues: officers, possible spin-off subgroups to progress particular activities, follow-on work plan (2) Status review of CAT-related activities: KV5, KV4, CATS, implementors' guidance/agreements, environment-specific extensions and specifications (e.g., proposed POSIX environment addendum, to include recommendations for GSS_set_default_cred and GSS_lookup_default_cred), X/Open liaison (3) Presentation(s) on implementation issues and experience (3a) Piers McMahon on SESAME multi-mechanism implementation (3b) others?? (4) Specific technical issues raised on CAT list and summarized below (5) FTP security discussion o Discuss changes to the FTP Security Internet Draft - Principal name fallback (use "rcmd" if "ftp" doesn't exist) - Changed GSS_Safe to GSS_Seal with conf_flag == FALSE - Changed GSS_Verify to GSS_Unseal - Changed GSS_Seal to GSS_Seal with conf_flag == TRUE - Changed the mailing list from ftp-wg@tgv.com to cat-ietf@mit.edu. o Reach closure on the length of buffers allowed for protected file transfers o Reach closure on the lack of restriction on the length of base-64 encodings o Decide on the targ_name for the GSSAPI specification for FTP - Since we have a "fall back" name for Kerberos V4 ("ftp" vs. "rcmd"), we've defined "SERVICE:ftp@hostname", but is there a more common name we could fall back on? o Get commitments for more implementations of FTP Security in general, including of the GSSAPI specification for FTP (6) Discussion of Internet Authentication Guidelines I-D, draft-haller-auth-requirements-01.<txt,ps>. (Atkinson/Haller: Ran Atkinson to present) (7) Portability levels: how far should we try to go in the direction of binary-level portability, and what's needed? Specific issues related to GSS-API RFC-1508: (1) Addition of GSS_inquire_context, per request (to enable libraries independent of a GSS-API implementation to extract information from a context structure), and list proposal (2) Multi-mechanism support requirements, facilities, and extensions: (2a) Proposal for gss_add_cred as replacement/preferred alternative to gss_acquire_cred; observation that acquire_cred isn't usefully specific in the errors it returns, and that input of a single name type constitutes a significantly limiting restriction, if more than a single mechanism is relevant. (2b) add GSS_BAD_MECH as possible return from gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context (2c) ambiguous scope of interpretation for minor_status values when no current mechanism is defined (as in gss_acquire_cred) (3) Renaming/deprecation of per-message primitives' names, per X/Open request: we agreed tentatively to do this pending E-mail review, but the list has been silent. The proposal on the table, per the July CAT WG minutes, is the following: (3a) GSS_Sign -> GSS_GetMIC (3b) GSS_Seal -> GSS_Wrap (3c) GSS_Verify -> GSS_VerifyMIC (3d) GSS_Unseal -> GSS_Unwrap Going once? Going twice? :-) (4) Raised, but unresolved, at last meeting: new or extended per-message service to allow confidentiality without integrity? (5) Other erratum: GSS_init_sec_context's GSS_NO_CONTEXT return should be clarified as covering any case where the input context_handle can't be used. (Unless the caller has a pending context establishment in progress, no non-zero input handle is acceptable.) Specific issues related to GSS-API C Bindings RFC-1509: (1) Currently, there's no clear transition between the last routine discussed (GSS_Inquire_cred, section 3.20) and the following header file data ("gssapi.h"). This should be fixed, and it would be beneficial for portability, making object-level porting plausible, if all implementors employed the same header file as incorporated in the standard. Suggestion: add a section header for "gssapi.h", confirming that its use is an element of conformance to the GSS-API C bindings. (2) Acquire_cred should be able to accept a NULL desired_name, to match 1508. (3) GSS_Process_context_token should be changed to accept a pointer to context_handle, corresponding to fix made to GSS_Delete_sec_context.