Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets-03.txt> (Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks) to Informational RFC
SM <sm@resistor.net> Wed, 03 April 2013 04:28 UTC
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Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2013 21:08:33 -0700
To: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
From: SM <sm@resistor.net>
Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implications-on-ipv4-nets-03.txt> (Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks) to Informational RFC
In-Reply-To: <515B6A04.9080400@si6networks.com>
References: <20130329130326.13012.1402.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20130330230305.0bce91a8@resistor.net> <2671C6CDFBB59E47B64C10B3E0BD5923042CFA4019@PRVPEXVS15.corp.twcable.com> <6.2.5.6.2.20130401134936.0a5a1420@resistor.net> <515B6A04.9080400@si6networks.com>
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Hi Fernando, At 16:30 02-04-2013, Fernando Gont wrote: >Happy eyeballs is about HTTP. But part of the approach predates "Happy >Eyeballs" -- please see RFC5461. Ok. >Removing the AAAA records when you're not going to allow such >connectivity reduces the potential problem (at the end of the day, this >is kind of the whitelisting approach that has been applied to the >general case by content providers -- with the caveat that in this case >you positively know that such connectivity is not present). Here's an extract from RFC 4924: 'In particular, the DNSSEC protocol described in "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions" [RFC4035] has been designed to verify that DNS information has not been modified between the moment they have been published on an authoritative server and the moment the validation takes place. Since that verification can take place at the application level, any modification by a recursive forwarder or other intermediary will cause validation failures, disabling the improved security that DNSSEC is intended to provide.' I am ok with resolving the problem of the day. If I am of the opinion that it may cause problems in the long run I'll mention it. I am not inclined to do anything more than that. Regards, -sm
- Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… Brian E Carpenter
- Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… SM
- Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… Fernando Gont
- Re: [OPSEC] Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-imp… Fernando Gont
- RE: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… George, Wes
- Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… SM
- RE: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… SM
- Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… Fernando Gont
- Re: [OPSEC] Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-imp… Brian E Carpenter
- Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… Fernando Gont
- Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… Ted Lemon
- Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… SM
- Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-implication… Fernando Gont
- Re: [OPSEC] Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-imp… Fernando Gont
- Re: [OPSEC] Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-imp… Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [OPSEC] Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-imp… Fernando Gont