Re: Question - Can DNSSEC be operated in a manner which meets Khaled mandates?

todd glassey <tglassey@earthlink.net> Thu, 22 July 2010 00:09 UTC

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Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2010 17:09:57 -0700
From: todd glassey <tglassey@earthlink.net>
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To: Peter DeVries <peter@devries.tv>
Subject: Re: Question - Can DNSSEC be operated in a manner which meets Khaled mandates?
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 On 7/21/2010 1:41 PM, Peter DeVries wrote:
> Todd, I just read the ruling on this and am confused as to why you
> would think this applies to DNSSEC rather than DNS (or other
> information systems).  
Because I read the opinion and looked at what the idea of trustworthy
meant to the court. Something that is really really different than what
technical people think trustworthy meets.
> The reason this case was unable to proceed and
> the evidence was rejected seems to be because of the police handling
> of the system and witness.  The ruling specifically states that
> video/evidence capture devices are still admissible (See section II
> "analysis") as long as timeline and/or "reasonable representation of
> what it is alleged to portray." is available.
So then the time-service and sequence of events would need to be
provable... I totally get that.
> The problem is that the officer made available to the court had no
> firsthand knowledge of the incident, no understanding of the system,
> no knowledge of the time of information handling, and no internal
> knowledge of the development / testing of the system
Yep...
> Either this applies everywhere and DNSSEC is not unique or it applies
> nowhere as the data path will be further confirmed by
> administrator/operator knowledge.
Bingo - it applies everywhere. But the idea of DNSSEC being a solution
to the issue of evidence capture regarding any and all processes
> Can you explain in more detail with specific references as to how this
> applies to DNSSEC or IS systems as a whole.  I fail to see your
> concern.  
It applies to everything that creates data which could come to be
reviewed by a court.
> Also, operations is separate from prosecution.  DNSSEC has
> other purposes than prosecution and can most certainly be operated
> within this ruling.  I don't personally see issues with prosecution as
> long as the witnesses understand and explain how the situation was
> handled.
The problem is the integrity of the data model and whether it produces
> BTW, the appeals case number I read is: 30-2009-00304893.  Please let
> me know if there is another case you are referencing.

No that's it.
> Peter
>
> On Wed, Jul 21, 2010 at 3:56 PM, todd glassey <tglassey@earthlink.net> wrote:
>>  Folks - there is a Court Ruling from the 4th Appellate District which
>> is turning off Red Light Camera's everywhere and there is a question as
>> to whether that ruling would also effect how Secure DNS Services are run
>> and if so what would it do.
>>
>> The ruling is called California v Khaled and is getting significant
>> traction here in the State of California in all courts.
>>
>> Todd
>>
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